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This paper reviews methods for the estimation of dynamic discrete choice structural models
and discusses related econometric issues. We consider single agent models, competitive equilib-
rium models and dynamic games. The methods are illustrated with descriptions of empirical
studies which have applied these techniques to problems in diﬀerent areas of economics. Pro-
gramming codes for the estimation methods are available in a companion web page.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper reviews recent developments in the literature on the estimation of discrete choice dy-
namic programming models of individual behavior. The goal of this paper is to provide an update
of existing surveys of this literature, e.g. Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) and Rust (1994a).1 In order
to avoid repetition, we emphasize the methodological contributions during the last decade. Thus,
some of the major themes of the survey are: the extension of methods which avoid repeated full
solution of the structural model in estimation; the development and increased use of simulation
and approximation methods; and the exploration of techniques that allow researchers to estimate
dynamic equilibrium models, both strategic and competitive. This paper tries to make the reader
familiar with these recent developments. With that purpose in mind, this survey is complemented
with programs that implement the estimation methods we describe. These programs are available
at the journal’s web site.
In dynamic discrete choice structural models, agents are forward looking and maximize expected
intertemporal payoﬀs. The parameters to be estimated are structural in the sense that they describe
agents’ preferences and beliefs about technological and institutional constraints. Under the princi-
ple of revealed preference, these parameters are estimated using micro data on individuals’ choices
and outcomes. Thus an attractive feature of this literature is that structural parameters have a
1Other excellent surveys are Rust (1994b), Pakes (1994) and Miller (1997).
1transparent interpretation within the theoretical model that frames the empirical investigation.
Moreover, econometric models in this class are useful tools for the evaluation of new (counterfac-
tual) policies.2 Seminal papers include Wolpin (1984) on fertility and child mortality, Miller (1984)
on occupational choice, Pakes (1986) on patent renewal, and Rust (1987) on machine replacement.
A well known impediment to the development of this literature has been the computational com-
plexity of estimation. Solving the structural model or evaluating an estimation criterion such as
the likelihood can both be non-trivial numerical tasks, and esti m a t i o ni nt h i sc o n t e x tt y p i c a l l yr e -
quires the use of algorithms in which a dynamic programming solution procedure is nested in the
optimization of the estimation criterion. In spite of this, over the last twenty years there has been
as i g n i ﬁcant number of interesting applications of these models to diﬀerent areas in economics. In
this paper, we will select a few of these applications as examples to illustrate estimation methods
and econometric issues. Many of the problems encountered by applied researchers are the same as
in other discrete choice microeconometric models, e.g., permanent unobserved heterogeneity, initial
conditions, censored outcomes and sample selection, measurement error, endogeneity, identiﬁcation,
etc. Having to consider explicit solutions to the dynamic optimization problem that is postulated
to describe individual behavior adds another layer of complexity. But such a close link between
economic theory and the econometric model can also provide more insight into the econometric
problems.
Our discussion of estimation methods will follow a classiﬁcation based on two criteria. The ﬁrst
criterion is the type of interactions between agents which the structural model explicitly takes into
account. According to this criterion we distinguish single-agent models, dynamic games, and com-
petitive equilibrium models. The estimation of equilibrium models and dynamic strategic games
involves speciﬁc econometric issues which are not present in single agent models. In particular, mul-
tiple equilibria, the endogeneity of other players’ actions and prices, and the curse of dimensionality
associated with the number of heterogeneous players and the state of the economy.
A second natural classiﬁcation criterion is the structure of the unobservables. Diﬀerent assump-
tions on the structure of the unobservables lead to very diﬀerent estimation methods, as already
noted by Eckstein and Wolpin (1989). Multi-dimensional numerical integration and the so called
initial conditions problem are important issues that arise in dynamic discrete choice models (struc-
tural or not) in which unobservables are correlated across choices or over time. Dealing with these
issues can add considerable complexity to the solution and estimation of dynamic discrete choice
structural models.
2See Wolpin (1996) for a review of some uses of these models for public policy anlaysis.
2Our discussion of estimation methods for single agent problems proceeds in three steps. First,
we review methods for Rust’s model with additively separable, conditionally independent and ex-
treme value distributed unobservables. Second, we consider several important departures from
Rust’s framework, such as allowing for permanent unobserved heterogeneity, non additive shocks,
correlation across choices and observable but choice-censored state-variables or payoﬀs. We group
all such models under the label Eckstein-Keane-Wolpin models after the authors who have con-
tributed many applications and methodological advances. Third, we discuss estimation of models
with serially correlated unobservables and continuous state variables. While we can compute ex-
actly the solution of a discrete, ﬁnite horizon dynamic decision model, the solution to models with
inﬁnite horizons and continuous observable state v a r i a b l e si sa l w a y sa na p p r o x i m a t i o na n dm o s to f
the methods and applications in the literature have considered speciﬁcations where continuous state
variables are discretized. Approximation errors may have an eﬀect on inferences and conclusions
in applied work. We include a brief discussion of this issue.
For the sake of space, this paper does not cover several topics in this literature which have
received attention in recent years. Some omissions that we are aware of are nonparametric and
semiparametric identiﬁcation and estimation (see Magnac and Thesmar, 2002, Aguirregabiria, 2007,
Bajari and Hong, 2005, and Heckman and Navarro, 2007), and application of parallel computing
(see Ferrall, 2005).
Section 2 introduces the notation and basic assumptions, illustrates the main issues that arise in
estimation of dynamic discrete choice structural models and presents four examples of applications.
Each of these examples deals with one of the four classes of models that we examine in the survey:
single-agent models under Rust’s framework; single-agent models under the Eckstein-Keane-Wolpin
framework; dynamic general equilibrium models; and dynamic strategic games. This section is self-
contained and tries to provide an introduction to this literature for a second year PhD student.
Sections 3, 4 and 5 deal with the detail of methods for the estimation of single-agent models,
dynamic games and general equilibrium models, respectively. The idea is that, after reading section
2, the reader can go to either of these sections to learn about the details of speciﬁc methods.
2 Models and examples
2.1 Single agent models
Time is discrete an indexed by t. We index agents by i. Agents have preferences deﬁned over a
sequence of states of the world from period t =0until period t = T. The time horizon T can be
3either ﬁnite or inﬁnite. The state of the world at period t for individual i has two components:
a vector of state variables sit that is known at period t;a n dad e c i s i o nait chosen at period
t that belongs to the discrete set A = {0,1,...,J}. The time index t can be a component of
the state vector sit, which may also contain time-invariant individual characteristics. Agents’
preferences over possible sequences of states of the world can be represented by a utility function
PT
j=0 βj U(ai,t+j,s i,t+j),w h e r eβ ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor and U(ait,s it) is the current utility
function.3 The decision at period t aﬀects the evolution of future values of the state variables, but
the agent faces uncertainty about these future values. The agent’s beliefs about future states can
be represented by a Markov transition distribution function F(si,t+1|ait,s it).4 These beliefs are
rational in the sense that they are the true transition probabilities of the state variables.5 Every
period t the agent observes the vector of state variables sit and chooses his action ait ∈ A to
maximize the expected utility
E
µXT−t
j=0 βj U(ai,t+j,s i,t+j) | ait,s it
¶
. (1)
This is the agent’s dynamic programming (DP) problem. Let α(sit) and V (sit)be the optimal
decision rule and the value function of the DP problem, respectively.6 By Bellman’s principle of
optimality the value function can be obtained using the recursive expression:





V (si,t+1) dF(si,t+1 | a,sit)
¾
(2)
and the optimal decision rule is then α(sit) = argmaxa∈A {v(a,sit)} where, for every a ∈ A,
v(a,sit) ≡ U(a,sit)+β
Z
V (si,t+1) dF(si,t+1 | a,sit) (3)
is a choice-speciﬁc value function.
We are interested in the estimation of the structural parameters in preferences, transition prob-
abilities, and the discount factor β.7 Suppose that a researcher has panel data for N individuals
3We do not consider deviations from this expected utility, time-separable framework. Note that β is constant over
time, e.g., hyperbolic discounting is ruled out.
4The utility function and the transition probability functions are not indexed by time or individual. This is
without loss of generality because time and individual heterogeneity can be arguments in the state vector sit.
5If the only data available are (longitudinal) data on choices and states, then preferences, beliefs and the actual
transition probabilities cannot be separately identiﬁed in general. In this sense, rational expectations is an identi-
ﬁcation assumption. It can be relaxed if the researcher has data on elicited beliefs and is able to use that data in
estimation. See Manski (2004) and Delavande (2006) for a discussion and example.
6Again, and without loss of generality, we omit time and individual subindexes from the arguments of these
functions because they are implicit in the state vector sit.
7The discount factor is assumed constant across agents. In most applications this parameter is not estimated
because it is poorly identiﬁed (e.g., see Rust, 1987). Also note that the decision horizon T is the same for all agents
and known by the econometrician.
4w h ob e h a v ea c c o r d i n gt ot h i sd e c i s i o nm o d e l .F o re v e r yo b s e r v a t i o n(i,t) in this panel dataset, the
researcher observes the individual’s action ait and a subvector xit of the state vector sit. Therefore,
from an econometric point of view, we can distinguish two subsets of state variables: sit =( xit,ε it),
where the subvector εit is observed by the agent but not by the researcher. Note that εit is a source
of variation in the decisions of agents conditional on the variables observed by the researcher. It is
the model’s ’econometric error’, which is given a structural interpretation as an unobserved state
variable.8 In some applications the researcher also observes one or more payoﬀ variables. We
deﬁne a payoﬀ variable as a variable yit which contains information about utility but is not one
of the model’s actions or state variables.9 Payoﬀ variables depend on current action and state
variables. We specify this relationship as yit = Y (ait,x it,ε it),w h e r eY (.) is the payoﬀ function,
e.g., an earnings function, a production function, etc.10 In summary, the researcher’s dataset is:
Data = { ait ,x it , yit : i =1 ,2,...,N ; t =1 ,2,...,T i} (4)
where Ti is the number of periods over which we observe individual i.11 In microeconometric
applications of single-agent models, we typically have that N is large and Ti is small.
Let θ be the vector of structural parameters and let gN(θ) be an estimation criterion for this
model and data, such as a likelihood or a GMM criterion. For instance, if the data are a random
sample over individuals and the criterion is a log-likelihood, then gN(θ)=
PN
i=1 li(θ),w h e r eli(θ)
is the contribution to the log-likelihood function of individual i’s history:
li(θ)=l o g P r ( ait,y it,x it : t =1 ,2,...,T i | θ)
=l o g P r ( α(xit,ε it,θ)=ait,Y(ait,x it,ε it,θ)=yit,x it : t =1 ,2,...,T i | θ)
(5)
Whatever the estimation criterion, in order to evaluate it for a particular value of θ it is necessary
to know the optimal decision rules α(xit,ε it,θ). Therefore, for each trial value of θ the DP problem
needs to be solved exactly, or its solution approximated in some way.
So far we have not made any assumption on the relationship between observable and unobserv-
able variables. These are key modelling decisions in the econometrics of dynamic discrete structural
8See Rust (1994) for a discussion of alternative interpretations of the econometric error.
9That is, we can write U(ait,s it) as ˜ U(yit,a it,s it). For instance, in a model of ﬁrm behavior the researcher may
observe ﬁrms’ output, revenue or the wage bill; or in a model of individual behavior the econometrician may observe
individual earnings.
10The payoﬀ function can also incorporate stochastic components such as measurement error in payoﬀ variables or
structural innovations which are not state variables because they are iid over time and unknown to the agent when
he makes his decision.
11Here the index t sequences each individual’s observations. Strictly speaking, it is not the same as the time period
index in the description of the structural model, but distinguishing between the two at this stage would make the
notation unnecessarily cumbersome.
5models. The form of li(θ) and the choice of the appropriate solution and estimation methods cru-
cially depend on these assumptions. We ﬁrst introduce six assumptions that describe what we
deﬁne as Rust’s model. This is the simplest framework for estimation and it has been used in many
applications beginning with the bus engine replacement model in Rust (1987).
ASSUMPTION AS (Additive separability): The one-period utility function is additively separable
in the observable and unobservable components: U(a,xit,ε it)=u(a,xit)+εit(a),w h e r eεit(a) is a
zero mean random variable with support the real line.12 That is, there is one unobservable state
variable for each choice alternative, so the dimension of εit is (J +1 )× 1.
ASSUMPTION IID (iid unobservables): The unobserved state variables in εit are independently
and identically distributed over agents and over time with CDF Gε(εit) which has ﬁnite ﬁrst mo-
ments and is continuous and twice diﬀerentiable in εit.13
ASSUMPTION CI-X (Conditional independence of future x): Conditional on the current values
of the decision and the observable state variables, next period observable state variables do not
depend on current ε:i . e . ,CDF(xi,t+1|ait,x it,ε it)=Fx(xi,t+1| ait,x it).W eu s eθf to represent the
vector of parameters that describe the transition probability function Fx.
ASSUMPTION CI-Y (Conditional independence of y): Conditional on the values of the decision
and the observable state variables, the value of the payoﬀ variable y is independent of ε:i . e . ,
Y (ait,x it,ε it)=Y (ait,x it). The vector of parameters that describe Y is θY .
ASSUMPTION CLOGIT: The unobserved state variables {εit(a):a =0 ,1,...,J} are independent
across alternatives and have an extreme value type 1 distribution.
ASSUMPTION DIS (Discrete support of x): The support of xit is discrete and ﬁnite: xit ∈ X =
{x(1),x (2),...,x (|X|)} with |X| < ∞.
Note that assumptions IID and CI-X together imply that F(xi,t+1,ε i,t+1|ait,x it,ε it)=Gε(εi,t+1)
Fx(xi,t+1| ait,x it), what corresponds to the conditional independence assumption in Rust (1987).
It is convenient to distinguish several components in the vector of structural parameters: θ =
{θu,θY ,θf},w h e r eθY and θf have been deﬁned above and θu represents all the parameters in
the utility function which are not in θY as well as the parameters in the distribution of Gε.I n
12Unbounded support is as important as additive separability in assumption AS. To see this, suppose that
U(a,xit,ε it)=u(a,xit)exp{εit(a)} with E(exp{εit(a)}|xit)=1 . It is clear that we can rewrite this utility func-
tion as u(a,xit)+ε
∗
it(a),w h e r eε
∗
it(a) is equal to u(a,xit)[exp{εit(a)} − 1].N o t et h a tε
∗
it(a) is additive in the utility
and it is a zero mean random variable. However, its range of variation is not the real line but only the positive real
numbers.
13Rust (1994) presents a weaker version of this assumption where the second and higher moments of εit may depend
on xit. However, this weaker version of the assumption is hardly ever used in practive.
6order to illustrate this framework, we present an example of a model of retirement from the labor
force which is based on the models of Rust and Phelan (1997) and Karlstrom, Palme and Svensson
(2004).
EXAMPLE 1. (Retirement from the labor force). Every period the individual decides
whether to continue working (ait =1 )or to retire and start collecting social security pension
beneﬁts (ait =0 ) . This is an optimal stopping problem with a ﬁnite horizon, where t =1is
the earliest age at which the individual can retire and T is age at death.14 Let rait denote the
individual’s retirement status. If he has not retired yet, rait =0 . If retired, rait is the age at














− θu6 ait (6)
cit is current consumption. θu1 is the coeﬃc i e n to fr e l a t i v er i s ka v e r s i o n . T h ee x p r e s s i o ni nt h e
exponential term captures individual heterogeneity in the marginal utility of consumption. In
particular, hit is an indicator of good health status, mit is an indicator of marital status, and tit is
age. Finally, the last term is associated with the utility of leisure. θu6 is the disutility of working.
In our notation, θu =( θu1,θu2,...,θu6). The unobservable state variables εit(1) and εit(0) enter
additively in the utilities of working and not working, respectively, and they can be interpreted
as transitory and idiosyncratic shocks to the utility from leisure. These random variables are
independently distributed over time and over individuals with an extreme value distribution.
Consumption is equal to current income (yit) minus health care expenditures net of insurance
reimbursements (hcit): cit = yit − hcit. If the individual works, his income is equal to stochastic






. If the individual decides to retire, then
his earnings are equal to social security pension beneﬁts bit. The econometrician observes earnings
yit and yit = aitwit +(1−ait)bit. Labor earnings depend on age, health status, marital status, past
earnings history through pension points and an unobservable shock ξit.I np a r t i c u l a r ,
wit =e x p
½
θw1 + θw2hit + θw3mit + θw4
tit
1+tit
+ θw5ppit + ξit
¾
(7)
Earnings yit are a payoﬀ variable and θY =( θw1,θw2,...,θw5,σ2
ξ) is the vector of parameters in
the corresponding payoﬀ function, where σ2
ξ i st h ev a r i a n c eo fξit. Retirement beneﬁts depend on
retirement age (rait)a n do npension points or social security wealth ppit: bit = b(rait,pp it).T h e
14Rust and Phelan allow for uncertainty about the age at death. In their speciﬁcation, the hazard of death varies
with age and T is a terminal age at which the probability of death is 1.
7form of the function b(.,.) depends on the rules of the pension system, which are known to the
econometrician. Health care expenditures are stochastic, with a Pareto distribution conditional on
health and marital status.
The vector of observable state variables is xit = {hit,hc it,m it,t it,ra it,pp it}. Age and retirement
age have obvious deterministic transition rules. Pension points are a deterministic function of
past earnings history. However, as argued by Rust and Phelan (1997) and Rust et al (2000), for
many pension systems, including the US system, thet r a n s i t i o nr u l eo fp e n s i o np o i n t sc a nb ev e r y
closely approximated by a Markov process with transition probability function Fpp(ppi,t+1|wit,pp it).
This transition probability is nonparametrically speciﬁed. Health status and marital status follow
ﬁrst order Markov processes with transition probabilities Fh(hi,t+1|hit) and Fm(mi,t+1|mit) which
are nonparametrically speciﬁed. Though health expenditures and pension points are continuous
variables, Rust and Phelan discretize these variables. An important feature of this model is that
the shock to wages ξit is assumed serially uncorrelated, independent of the state variables xit
and εit, and unknown to the individual at the time he makes his period t decision. Therefore, ξit
determines the transition of labor earnings but it is not a state variable and assumption CI-Y holds:
i.e., conditional of (ait,x it) observed earnings are independent of the unobserved state variables in
εit.
R u s ta n dP h e l a nu s ear i c h e rs p e c i ﬁcation of this model which allows for part time work and
post-retirement work and includes a detailed description of Social Security and Medicare beneﬁts
to help explain several aspects of retirement behavior in the US. Counterfactual experiments based
on their estimated model suggest that the peak in retirement behavior at age 65 is largely due to
the fact that Social Security beneﬁts are actuarially unfair after age 65 and to the fact that ’health
insurance constrained’ individuals have to wait to age 65 in order to apply for Social Security
beneﬁts and qualify for Medicare. Karlstrom, Palme and Svensson (2004) use their model to
simulate the eﬀect of a three year delay in retirement beneﬁts.¥
Imposing additive separability implies that the marginal utility of observable state variables,
today and in future periods, does not depend on unobservables. For instance, in Example 1 the
decision to retire or to continue working determines the current and future level of consumption.
However, additive separability in the econometric model implies that observed variation in retire-
ment choices cannot be linked to unobserved heterogeneity in the marginal utility of consumption.
Relatedly, an individual considering early retirement in this model would presumably weigh uncer-
tainty about the value of her marginal utility of consumption in the future. Additive separability
8implies that unobserved state variables induce no uncertainty about the marginal utility of con-
s u m p t i o n ,w h i c hm a yh a v ea ne ﬀect on the patterns of behavior the model can explain and on
estimation of structural parameters such as the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. As in the case
of assumption CI-X which we discuss next, assumption AS may not be too restrictive if the model
speciﬁcation and the data are suﬃciently rich in observable explanatory variables; i.e., observable
state variables which are unconstrained by assumptions AS, IID and CI-X, vary across individuals
and time and correlate with behavior.
Assumptions IID and CI-X restrict the joint transition probability of state variables. These
restrictions have two main implications which can be illustrated in Example 1. First, the unobserved
shocks to the utility of leisure are serially uncorrelated, i.e., transitory. And second, the probability
that a person’s health or marital status will change between the current period and the next one
could depend on whether this person is currently working, but once we take this into account it does
not depend on the current value of the shocks to the utility of leisure.15 Suppose we interpret these
unobservable shocks as health shocks not included in the observable hit. The shocks are important
enough because they can explain individuals’ changes in labor supply decisions, but they should be
’transitory’ since according to CI-X they cannot have any direct impact on next period’s health.
An important implication of assumptions IID and CI-X is that the solution to the DP problem
is fully characterized by the integrated value function or Emax function, ¯ V (xit),w h i c hi st h e
expectation of the value function over the distribution of unobservable state variables, conditional
on the observable state variables: ¯ V (xit) ≡
R
V (xit,ε it) dGε(εit). This function is the unique
















Under these assumptions, the size of the state space X is the relevant measure of computational
complexity, and given that X is discrete and ﬁnite the DP problem can be solved exactly. The





¯ V (xit+1) fx(xi,t+1|a,xit) (9)
15In Rust and Phelan’s speciﬁcation the probability that a person’s health or marital status will change between
the current period and the next one does not depend on whether this person is currently working.
16There is a slight abuse of notation here because we use the same v() function as in equation (3), but the
alternative-speciﬁc value function here does not depend on εit(a).
9Another important implication of assumptions IID and CI-X is that the observable state vector
xit is a suﬃcient statistic for the current choice. The contribution of individual i to the log-likelihood





t=1 logfY (yit|ait,x it,θY )
+
XTi−1
t=1 logfx(xi,t+1|ait,x it,θf)+l o gP r ( xi1|θ)
(10)
fY is the density of the payoﬀ variable conditional on (ait,x it). In example 1, under assumption
CI-Y, this density is quite straightforward: I{ait =1 }φ([logyit−θw1−θw2hit−θw3mit−θw4
tit
1+tit −
θw5ppit]/σξ),w h e r eI{.} is the indicator function and φ(.) is the density of a standard normal. This
can greatly simplify the estimation of θY .18 fx is the transition density function associated with
Fx.T h et e r mlogPr(xi1|θ) is the contribution of initial conditions to the likelihood of individual
i. In most applications a conditional likelihood approach is followed and this term is ignored.
No bias is incurred as long as unobservables are serially independent. Even when there is a loss
of eﬃciency, the conditional likelihood is simpler to compute. Accordingly, hereafter the term
’likelihood’ by default refers to the conditional likelihood. The term P(ait|xit,θ) is the Conditional
Choice Probability (CCP) obtained by integrating the optimal decision rule over the unobservable
state variables. The optimal decision rule is α(xit,ε it) = argmaxa∈A {v(a,xit)+εit(a)}. Therefore,






I {v(a,xit)+εit(a) >v (a0,x it)+εit(a0) for all a0}dGε(εit)
(11)
When {εit(a)} are iid type 1 extreme value random variables, as in example 1, the multi-dimension
integrals in the integrated Bellman equation and in the deﬁnition of CCPs have closed form ana-
lytical expressions. This is the DP conditional logit model with Bellman equation19

















17To see this, deﬁne ˜ ait, ˜ xit and ˜ yit as the vectors with the histories of the individual’s decisions, states and outcomes,
respectively, from period 1 until t. Assumptions IID, CI-X and CI-Y imply that Pr(ait,y it,x it | ˜ ai,t−1, ˜ yi,t−1, ˜ xi,t−1)=
fY (yit | ait,x it)Pr(ait | xit)fx (xit | ai,t−1,x i,t−1).
18Note that ξit is censored for the econometrician since wages are observed only when the individual works.
However, under assumption CI-Y this censoring does not introduce any bias in the estimation of the wage equation
by OLS. We discuss this issue in more detail in section 3.
19Since X is discrete and ﬁnite, we can represent Bellman equation as a system of equations in the Euclid-
ean space R
|X|.L e t ¯ V be the |X|×1 vector with the values ¯ V (x
(1)), ¯ V (x
(2)), ..., ¯ V (x
(|X|)).T h e n , ¯ V is the
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If v(a,xit) were a linear function of the parameters θ, these expressions would be familiar as the
choice probability of binary probit, logit or multinomial logit models. In general, v(a,xit) is a
complex non-linear function of θ which has to be computed from the Bellman equation in (12).
The relative simplicity of dynamic discrete choice models under Rust’s assumptions and their
similarity with static discrete choice econometric models, has contributed to more extensive devel-
opment of this framework. The econometric theory is better understood, and some general results
on identiﬁcation are available (see Rust, 1994, Magnac and Thesmar, 2002, and Aguirregabiria,
2007). Factorization of the likelihood in (10) allows for a computationally advantageous estimation
approach. Our review of estimation methods begins in section 3.1 with methods for this class
of models. One line of research has developed estimation methods which avoid repeated solution
of the DP problem (see sections 3.1.2-3.1.4), and this computational advantage has made Rust’s
model the framework of choice in recent research on models with strategic interactions (see section
4). If the choice is not binary, an important restriction is involved in the CLOGIT assumption, i.e.,
that the unobservable state variables are independent across alternatives.
Our next example, based on Keane and Wolpin (1997), serves as an illustration of models
which relax some of the assumptions in Rust’s framework. More speciﬁcally, we highlight four
departures from the previous model: (1) unobservables which do not satisfy assumption AS; (2)
observable payoﬀ variables which are choice-censored andd on o ts a t i s f ya s s u m p t i o nC I - Y ;( 3 )
permanent unobserved heterogeneity (a departure of assumption IID); and (4) unobservables which
are correlated across choice alternatives (i.e., no CLOGIT assumption). Many applications have
included at least one of these four features, and in this survey we group all of them under the
label Eckstein-Keane-Wolpin (EKW) after the authors who are the main contributors. We review
estimation methods for EKW models in section 3.2.
EXAMPLE 2. (Occupational choice and the career decisions of young men). Each
period (year), starting at age 16 through a maximum age T, an individual chooses between staying
at home (ait =0 ), attending school (ait =4 ), or working at one of three occupations: white collar
(ait =1 ), blue collar (ait =2 ), or the military (ait =3 ). The speciﬁcation of the one-period utility
11function is:
U(0,s it)=ωi(0) + εit(0)
U(4,s it)=ωi(4) − θtc1 I(hit ≥ 12) − θtc2 I(hit ≥ 16) + εit(4)
U(a,sit)=Wit(a) for a =1 ,2,3
(14)
hit is schooling (in years). θtc1 and θtc2 are parameters that represent tuition costs in college and
graduate school, respectively. Wit(a) is the wage of individual i at period t in occupation a. Wages
in occupation a are the product of the skill price in that occupation, ra, and the individual’s skill
level for that occupation, which is an exponential function of an individual-speciﬁc endowment at
age 16, schooling, experience and a transitory shock. That is:
Wit(a)=ra exp
n




where kit(a) is cumulated work experience (in years) in occupation a. The vector εit = {εit(a):a ∈
A} contains choice-speciﬁc shocks to skill levels and to the monetary values of a year at school or
at home. They are assumed to be serially uncorrelated with a joint normal distribution with zero
means and unrestricted variance matrix. The vector ωi = {ωi(a):a ∈ A} contains occupation and
individual-speciﬁc endowments which are ﬁxed from age 16. This vector has a discrete support,
and its probability distribution is nonparametrically speciﬁed. Both εit and ωi are unobservable to
the econometrician but observable to the individual when he makes his decision at period t.T h e
vector of observable state variables is xit = {hit,t it,k it(a):a =1 ,2,3},w h e r etit represents age. All
the variables in xit have a discrete and ﬁnite support. Labor earnings are observable. This payoﬀ
variable is equal to zero when ait ∈ {0,4} and equal to Wit(ait) when ait ∈ {1,2,3}. Therefore, the
payoﬀ function is I{ait ∈ {1,2,3}}ra exp{ωi(a)+θa1 hit +θa2 kit(a)−θa3 (kit(a))
2 +εit(a)}.N o t e
that assumption CI-Y does not hold because the unobserved state variables εit(1), εit(2) and εit(3)
have a direct eﬀect on observed labor earnings.
The opportunity cost of investing in human capital by attending school is the value of foregone
earnings and work experience, or the utility of staying home. Working also has an investment value
since it increases occupation-speciﬁc skills and future earnings. An individual’s optimal career path
is partly determined by comparative advantage embedded in endowments at age 16.K e a n e a n d
Wolpin estimated this model on NLSY data.20 They found that unobserved skill endowments at
age 16 are a very important source of inequality in lifetime career paths, earnings and utility. To the
20Keane and Wolpin report estimates of two versions of this model. The ﬁrst ’bare bones’ version is the one
described here. The second one includes additional features such as disutilities of switching between choices and
permament unobserved heterogeneity in preferences, which are introduced in order to help the model ﬁt the degree
of persistence in choices observed in the data.
12extent that they are the root source of inequality, their counterfactual policy experiments suggest
that the impact of (large) college tuition subsidies on college attainment and income distribution
would be rather small. ¥
We now use example 2 to illustrate the practical implications for estimation of relaxing some
of Rust’s assumptions. The sum of the permanent and transitory unobserved skill components,
εit(a)+ωi(a), is a serially correlated state variable. The presence of autocorrelated unobservables
has important implications for the estimation of structural parameters. Individuals self-select into
occupations and schooling classes on the basis of persistent diﬀerences in skills which are unob-
served by the researcher. Ignoring this source of self-selection can result into an overestimation
of the returns to schooling and occupation-speciﬁc experience. Also, persistence in occupational
choices in the data may arise because there is a disutility of switching occupations (state depen-
dence), or because there are persistent diﬀerences in skills (unobserved heterogeneity). Failure to
control for the latter, if present, would lead to biased estimates of switching disutilities.21 With
serially correlated unobservables, the probability of an individual’s sequence of choices cannot be
factored into a product of conditional choice probabilities as in (10). The observable state xit is
not a suﬃcient statistic for ait because lagged choices contain information about the permanent
components ωi. However, conditional on ωi the transitory components {εi(a)} do satisfy assump-
tion IID. Since ωi has discrete support, each individual’s likelihood contribution can be obtained
as a ﬁnite mixture of likelihoods, each of which has the same form as in (10). If the support of ωi
is Ω = {ω1,ω2,...,ωL} ⊂ RJL,t h e nw eh a v et h a t
li(θ,Ω,π)=l o g
µXL
 =1 Li(θ,ω ) π |xi1
¶
(16)
where π |x ≡ Pr(ωi = ω |xi1 = x); π is the vector of parameters {π |x :   =1 ,2,...,L;x ∈ X};a n d
Li(θ,ω ) is
QTi
t=1 P(ait|xit,θ,ω ) fY (yit|ait,x it,θ,ω )
QTi−1
t=1 fx(xi,t+1|ait,x it,θf,ω ).22 Note that
the conditional density of the payoﬀ variable yit depends not only on θY , as in Rust’s model, but
on the whole vector of structural parameters θ. Conditioning on the current action ait introduces
selection or censoring in the payoﬀ variable and this selection eﬀect depends on all the parameters
of the model. An important implication of this feature of the model is that (even if there is not
permanent unobserved heterogeneity) θY and θu cannot be estimated separately.
Several issues are worth highlighting here. First, in general permanent unobserved heterogene-
21See Heckman (1981) for the ﬁrst discussion of this issue.
22In Example 2, the transitions of the observable state variables are all deterministic and do not depend on any
structural parameter. Therefore, in this example θf is an empty vector and the likelihood Li(θ,ω





13ity poses an initial conditions problem because the initial state xi1 is correlated with permanent
unobserved components. This problem is avoided if the structural model has an initial period in
which all the individuals have the same value of the vector x, and if this initial period is observed
in the sample. Under these conditions xi1 = x1 for every i and then Pr(ω |xi1) is constant over
individuals and equal to π , i.e., the unconditional mass probability of type   individuals which
is a primitive structural parameter. Keane and Wolpin’s model is an example of this in that all
individuals start ’life’ in the model at age 16 with zero experience in all occupations and the NLSY
data provide histories as of age 16. If x can take diﬀerent values in the behavioral model’s ﬁrst
decision period, then the researcher needs to specify how the distribution of permanent unobserved
heterogeneity varies with xi1. In Keane and Wolpin’s data there is variation in schooling measured
at age 16. It seems likely that initial schooling is correlated with other age 16 endowments, and
Keane and Wolpin allow for this as our mixture likelihood in (16) suggests. A more diﬃcult case
arises if individual histories are left-censored. We return to this issue in our review of estimation
methods for ﬁnite mixture models in Section 3.2.1. The focus there is on a structure with (dis-
crete) permanent unobserved heterogeneity and (continuous) iid transitory components, which is
the simplest way of allowing for autocorrelation in unobservable state variables.
Second, in order to evaluate the mixture of likelihoods the DP problem needs to be solved
as many times as the number of components in the mixture. This is the reason why permanent
unobserved heterogeneity is almost always introduced with a discrete and ﬁnite support. The
integrated value function or Emax function (conditional on individual’s type) ¯ V (xit) still fully





















,w h e r ev(a,xit,ω ,ε it)
is the term in brackets {} in equation (17). When ε0s are additively separable and extreme value
distributed, then we still have closed form expressions for the integrated Bellman equation and for
CCPs in terms of choice-speciﬁc value functions. In the occupational choice model of example 2
the transitory shocks to skills are not additively separable and, more important, they are correlated
across choices or occupations. This seems like a realistic (and even necessary) assumption to make
in this application; e.g., if the transitory component of labor market skills reﬂects an unobservable
health shock, the shock would likely have an eﬀect on both white collar and blue collar skills. But
14correlation across choices implies that integrated value functions and conditional choice probabilities
do not have the convenient closed forms of McFadden’s conditional logit. In this case, as well as
in models with more general autocorrelation structures, repeated calculation of multidimensional
integrals in the solution and/or estimation of the model is unavoidable. Section 3.2.2 reviews Keane
and Wolpin’s simulation and interpolation method, developed for the occupational choice model.
Simulation is used in order to compute multidimensional integrals, interpolation in order to handle
problems with very large state spaces.
Third, in example 2 transitory shocks to wages are observable to the decision maker and de-
termine the optimal occupational choice. This feature of the model implies that, in contrast with
example 1, there is a self-selection bias if we estimate the wage equation for an occupation by OLS
using the sub-sample of individuals whose wages are observed because they chose that occupation.
And fourth, in example 2 the shocks εit(2), εit(3) and εit(4) do not satisfy assumption AS, i.e., one
shock per alternative and additive separability combined with unbounded support. This implies
that the model is saturated (Rust 1994). That is, optimal choice probabilities P(a|x,ω ,θ) are
not strictly positive for every value of (a,x,ω ,θ) and this leads to well-known complications in
estimation.
So far, we have maintained the assumption that X is a discrete and ﬁnite set. However, in
many applications some state variables are continuous. DP problems with continuous state vari-
ables cannot be solved exactly and the solution need to be approximated using discretization or
interpolation methods. These approximation methods introduce an additional error in the estima-
tion of the model. The implications of this error for the properties of estimators is a complicated
issue because of the nonlinearity of the structural model. Section 3.3 discusses some recent develop-
ments in this area. In that section we also discuss methods for models with (time-variant) serially
correlated unobservables, and Bayesian methods.
2.2 Competitive equilibrium models
The single-agent models of Examples 1 and 2 are partial equilibrium models. They study one
side of the market (i.e., labor supply) taking prices and aggregate quantities as exogenously given.
Though useful for policy evaluation, it is well known that partial equilibrium analysis can give
misleading results if the assumption that prices are invariant to changes in the policy variables of
interest is not a good approximation. Equilibrium models are also better suited to improve our
understanding of economy-wide trends. Despite the limitations of partial equilibrium, there have
been very few studies that specify and estimate dynamic general equilibrium (GE) models with
15heterogeneous agents using micro data. An important exception is the study by Heckman, Lochner
and Taber (1998) who estimate and calibrate a heterogeneous-agent dynamic GE model of human
capital accumulation and earnings. They use their estimated model to study the sources of rising
wage inequality in the US economy. More recently, Lee (2005) and Lee and Wolpin (2006) have
estimated dynamic GE models of human capital accumulation in the same spirit as the study in
Heckman, Lochner and Taber, relaxing some of their assumptions and more fully incorporating
into the estimation process the equilibrium restrictions embodied in the theory.23
EXAMPLE 3. (Occupational choice in equilibrium). In order to make it more suitable
for the analysis of economy-wide aggregate data, consider the following changes in the model of
Example 2: a) Exclude the ’military’ occupational choice. b) Allow the utility parameters to vary
with gender and make the utility of the ’home’ alternative dependent on the number of children
of pre-school age nit: U(0,s it)=ωi(0) + θc nit + εit(0). The observable state variable nit which is
now part of xit follows an exogenous Markov process conditional on age, gender, education and
cohort. In Example 2, the skill rental prices ra in the wage equations (15) were assumed constants.
In this example the state vector is augmented to include skill prices and, most important, the law
of motion of skill prices is endogenously determined in the model as an equilibrium outcome. The
labor market is assumed to be competitive. The supply side consists of overlapping generations
of individuals aged 16 through 65, whose behavior corresponds to the occupational choice model.
The demand side can be characterized by the following Cobb-Douglas, constant returns to scale
aggregate production function:







where Yt is aggregate output, S1t and S2t are the aggregate quantities of white collar and blue
collar skills, and zt and Kt are total factor productivity and the aggregate capital stock, which
follow exogenously determined processes.24 Technical change is captured (deterministically) in
time-varying factor shares {α1t,α 2t} as well as in total factor productivity. Demand side competitive











for a =1 ,2 (19)
23This emergent microeconometric literature on estimation of dynamic GE models is related to macro literature
on GE models with heterogeneous agents. See Krusell and Smith (1998) and Rios-Rull (1999). There is also an
important and large literature in labor economics on the estimation of equilibrium search models with heterogeneous
workers and ﬁrms. See Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Eckstein and van den Berg (2007) for surveys.
24It is implicitly assumed that the distribution of capital rental income among individuals has no eﬀect on labor
supply decisions.
16Let e Xt denote aggregate state variables relevant to the individual’s occupational choice problem,
i.e. current skill rental prices and other aggregate variables which agents use to predict future
skill rental prices. The state vector of the occupational choice model is augmented with e Xt and
individuals are assumed to know its law of motion. The aggregate supplies of skills are obtained






a = α(xit,ωi,ε it, e Xt)
o
for a =1 ,2 (20)
where kit(a) is individual i0s stock of skill in occupation a, α() is the optimal decision rule, and
the integral represents the appropriately weighted sum over the distribution of individual state
variables.
In a (rational expectations) competitive equilibrium, the sequence of skill rental prices {r1t,r 2t :
t =1 ,2,...} a n dt h el a wo fm o t i o no f e Xt satisfy the following conditions. First, individuals solve the
occupational choice problem taking the law of motion of e Xt as given. Second, labor markets for both
white and blue collar skills clear, i.e., the resulting aggregate skill supply functions, together with
skill prices, satisfy the labor demand conditions (19). And, third, the actual law of motion of e Xt
is consistent with individuals’ beliefs. The equilibrium need not be stationary: besides dependence
on initial conditions e X1, there are other sources of non-stationarity such as time variation in factor
shares in the aggregate production function, changes in cohort sizes, cohort eﬀects in fertility, etc.
An important question the equilibrium model can address is the extent to which ’feedback’
eﬀects oﬀset the impact of policies such as the college tuition subsidy evaluated by Keane and
Wolpin in partial equilibrium. That is, the subsidy may increase the supply of white collar skills to
the extent that it induces higher college enrollment. If the relative price of white collar skills falls
as a result, this reduces the returns to schooling and college enrollment. Lee (2005) estimates the
equilibrium model on CPS data and concludes that feedback eﬀects in the US were quite small.
Lee and Wolpin (2006) extend this framework, allowing for three occupations in an economy with
two sectors, goods and services. They estimate the model on CPS and NLSY data and use it to
study the determinants of the large growth of employment in the service sector in the US over the
last 50 years. They conclude that demand factors (technological change and movements in product
and capital prices) were much more important than supply factors such as changes in cohort sizes
or the decline in fertility. ¥
The estimation of this model is considerably more demanding than that of its partial equilib-
rium version in Example 2 for two reasons. First, imposing the equilibrium restrictions increases the
computational burden of estimation by an order of magnitude. Second, estimation of the equilib-
17rium model requires additional data which can only be obtained from diﬀerent sources and having
to combine multiple data sources poses some complications for estimation and inference.
Recall that the state space of the individual agent’s occupational choice problem is augmented
with aggregate variables f Xt , e.g. current and past values of skill prices, total factor productivity,
cohort sizes, the distributions of schooling and occupation-speciﬁc experience, and other variables
which predict future skill prices. Note that any such variable omitted by the econometrician
is a potential source of endogeneity bias because it is likely to be correlated with current skill
prices. The dimensionality of e Xt is potentially so large as to make solution - let alone estimation
- infeasible without some further simpliﬁcation. Lee (2005) assumes that skill price sequences are
deterministic and individual agents have perfect foresight; in this case, the state space is augmented
with the sequence of current and future deterministic skill prices. Lee and Wolpin (2006) assume
that stochastic skill prices are linear functions of a small number of state variables and search for
equilibria within this class of pricing functions. The equilibria they consider are thus approximations
to the ’full’ stochastic rational expectations equilibria implied by the model. For any given values
of the parameters to be estimated, the equilibrium laws of motion solve a ﬁxed point problem
which uses as input the solutions to the individual DP problems of all agents who interact in the
economy. This implies that a single evaluation of the estimation criterion nests two layers of ﬁxed
point problems.25 The estimation criterion is based on a set of moment conditions which summarize
occupational choices and wages obtained from micro survey data. We review the estimation of these
models in more detail in section 5.
2.3 Dynamic discrete games
The analysis of many economic and social phenomena requires the consideration of dynamic strate-
gic interactions between a relatively small number of agents. The study of the dynamics of oligopoly
industries is perhaps the most notorious example of these dynamic strategic interactions. Com-
petition in oligopoly industries involves important investment decisions which are irreversible to a
certain extent. Market entry in the presence of sunk entry costs is a simple example of this type
of investment. Dynamic games are powerful tools for the analysis of these dynamic strategic inter-
actions. Until very recently, econometric models of discrete games had been limited to relatively
simple static games. Two main econometric issues explain this limited range of applications: the
25Multiplicity of equilibria in these models cannot be ruled out in general, but computing multiple equilibria - if
they exist - is a diﬃcult task. Because of this, this issue tends to be ignored in empirical work. Estimation is carried
out under the assumption that the equilibrium is unique, and the validity of the assumption is scrutinized at the ﬁnal
parameter estimates. The recent literature on estimation of dynamic discrete games, which we review in sections 2.3
and 4, has been more concerned with the issue of multiple equilibria.
18computational burden in the solution of dynamic discrete games, and the indeterminacy problem
associated with the existence of multiple equilibria. The existence of multiple equilibria is a preva-
lent feature in most empirical games where best response functions are non-linear in other players’
actions. Models with multiple equilibria do not have a unique reduced form and this incomplete-
ness may pose practical and theoretical problems in the estimation of structural parameters. The
computational burden in the structural estimation of games is specially severe. The dimension of
the state space, and the cost of computing an equilibrium, increases exponentially with the number
of heterogeneous players. An equilibrium is a ﬁxed point of a system of best response operators
and each player’s best response is itself the solution to a dynamic programming problem.
In section 4 we review recent papers which have taken Rust’s framework of single agent prob-
lems, combined with Hotz-Miller’s estimation approach, as a starting point in the development of
estimable dynamic discrete games of incomplete information. Private information state variables
are a convenient way of introducing unobservables in the econometric model.26 Furthermore, under
certain regularity conditions dynamic games of incomplete information have at least one equilibrium
while that is not case in dynamic games of complete information (see Doraszelski and Satterthwaite,
2003). We provide here a description of the basic framework with no payoﬀ variables, based on
suitably extended versions of the AS, IID and CI-X assumptions (also see Rust (1994) pp. 154-158).
C o n s i d e rag a m et h a ti sp l a y e db yN players that we index by i ∈ I = {1,2,...,N}.E v e r y
period t these players decide simultaneously a discrete action. Let ait ∈ A = {0,1,...,J} be
the action of player i at period t. At the beginning of period t a player is characterized by
two vectors of state variables which aﬀect her current utility: xit and εit.V a r i a b l e s i n xit are
common knowledge for all players in the game, but the vector εit is private information of player
i.L e t xt ≡ (x1t,x 2t,...,x Nt) be the vector of common knowledge state variables, and similarly
deﬁne at ≡ (a1t,a 2t,...,a Nt),a n dl e tεt be the vector with all players’ private information. Let
Ui(at,x t,ε it) be player i’s current payoﬀ function, that depends on the actions of all the players,
the common knowledge state variables, and his own private information εit.A p l a y e r c h o o s e s
his action to maximize expected discounted intertemporal utility Et[
PT−t
j=0 βjUi(at+j,x t+j,ε i,t+j)],
where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor. Players have uncertainty about other players’ current and
future actions, about future common knowledge state variables, and about their own future private
26As far as we know, there are no estimable dynamic games of complete information. The estimation of this class of
games involves non trivial complications. For instance, other players’ current actions are not independent of common
knowledge unobservables. In contrast, unobservables which are private information state variables, independently
distributed across players, can explain at least part of the heterogeneity in players’ actions without generating this
endogeneity problem.
19information shocks. We assume that {xt,εt} follows a controlled Markov process with transition
probability function F(xt+1,εt+1|at,xt,εt). This transition probability is common knowledge.
Players’ strategies depend only on payoﬀ relevant state variables. Let α = {αi(xt,ε it):i ∈ I}
be a set of strategy functions, one for each player. Taking as given the strategies of all players
other than i, the decision problem of player i is just a standard single-agent DP problem. Let
V α
i (xt,ε it) be the value function of this DP problem. The Bellman equation is V α
i (xt,ε it)=
maxai∈A {vα
i (ai,x t,ε it)} where, for every ai ∈ A,
vα




i (xt+1,ε t+1) dF(xt+1,εt+1|ai,α −i(xt,ε −it),xt,ε t)
¾ (21)
and Eε−it represents the expectation over other players’ private information shocks. The best
response function of player i is bi(xt,ε it,α −i)=a r g m a x ai∈A {vα
i (ai,x t,ε it)}. This best response
function gives the optimal strategy of player i if the other players behave, now and in the future,
according to their respective strategies in α−i. A Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) in this game
is a set of strategy functions α∗ such that for any player i and for any (xt,ε it) we have that
α∗
i(xt,ε it)=bi(xt,ε it,α ∗
−i).
We now formulate the AS, IID and CI-X assumptions in the context of this game.
ASSUMPTION AS-Game: The one-period utility function is additively separable in common
knowledge and private information components: Ui(at,x t,ε it)=ui(at,x t)+εit(ait),w h e r eεit(a) is
the a-th component of vector εit. The support of εit(a) is the real line for all a.
ASSUMPTION IID-Game: Private information shocks εit are independently and identically dis-
tributed over agents and over time with CDF Gε(εit) which has ﬁnite ﬁrst moments and is contin-
uous and twice diﬀerentiable in εit.
ASSUMPTION CI-X-Game: Conditional on the current values of players’ actions and common
knowledge state variables, next period common knowledge state variables do not depend on current
private information shocks: i.e., CDF(xt+1|at,x t,ε t)=Fx(xt+1| at,x t).
As in the case of single-agent models, under assumptions AS, IID and CI-X the integrated value




i (xt,ε it)dGε(εit) fully characterizes player i’s DP problem. The integrated








ui(ai,α −i(xt,ε −it),x t)+β
Z
¯ V α
i (xt+1) dFx(xt+1|ai,α −i(xt,ε −it),xt)
¾
(22)
20Another implication of these assumptions is that a MPE can be described as a ﬁxed point of a
mapping in the space of CCPs which ’integrate out’ players’ private information variables. Given a
set of strategy functions α = {αi(xt,ε it):i ∈ I} we deﬁne a set of conditional choice probabilities
Pα = {Pα
i (ai|x):( i,ai,x) ∈ I × A × X} such that,
Pα
i (ai|x) ≡ Pr(αi(xt,ε it)=ai |xt = x)=
Z
I {αi(xt,ε it)=ai} dGε(εit) (23)
These probabilities represent the expected behavior of ﬁrm i from the point of view of the rest of













Note that the value functions vα
i (ai,x t) depend on other players’ strategies only through other play-









i (aj|xt). To emphasize this point we will use the notation vP
i instead
vα
i to represent these value functions.
Let α∗ be a set of MPE strategies and let P∗ ≡ {P∗
i (ai|x):for every (i,ai,x)} be the correspond-
ing CCPs. Then, it is straightforward to show that for every (i,ai,x), P∗
i (ai|x)=Λ(ai|vP∗
i (.,x)).
That is, P∗ is a ﬁxed point of P = Λ(vP),w h e r eΛ(vP) ≡ {Λ(ai|vP
i (.,x)) : for every (i,ai,x)}.
Given the assumptions on the distribution of private information, we can deﬁne best response
probability functions which are continuous in the compact set of players’ choice probabilities. By
Brower’s theorem, there exists at least one equilibrium. In general, the equilibrium is not unique.27
We now distinguish between observable and unobservable variables from the point of view of the
econometrician. In principle, we could distinguish observable and unobservable components both
in common knowledge and in private information state variables. We start with a more restrictive
and simpler case.
ASSUMPTION OC: All the common knowledge state variables in xt are observable to the econo-
metrician, and all the private information variables in εt are unobservable.
To complete this description of the econometric model we should comment on the sampling
framework. In the case of single agent models, we assumed that the econometrician has a random
sample of many agents (e.g., ﬁrms, households) behaving according to the model. That is not
27See Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2003) amd Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) for more details.
21the case in applications of dynamic strategic games where typically the number of players is quite
small, e.g., ﬁrms in an oligopoly market, members of a family, political parties, etc. We assume
that the game is played independently at diﬀerent locations, indexed by m, and that we have a
random sample of M of these locations. Therefore, taking into account Assumption OC, the data
consist of:
Data = { amt,x mt : m =1 ,2,...,M ; t =1 ,2,...,T m} (25)
Note that an assumption that is implicit in this description of the data is that we observe the actions
of all the players in the game. Our next example illustrates models with strategic interactions and
is based on Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007).
EXAMPLE 4. (An entry-exit game of incomplete information). The players are ﬁrms
making decisions on whether to enter, continuing to operate in, or exit from a market. The market
is a small local retail market and each active ﬁrm operates at one location or store. We observe
a random sample of markets, m =1 ,...,M. In each market there are N potentially active and
inﬁnitely lived ﬁr m s .E v e r yp e r i o da l lﬁrms decide simultaneously whether to operate their store
or not. If ﬁrm i in market m operates its store at time t (aimt =1 ) , its variable proﬁts depend on
the number of ﬁrms that choose to be active and on market demand conditions, as follows: θRS






,w h e r eθRS, θRN are parameters. Market demand conditions
are represented by market (population) size, Smt. Market size is common knowledge to ﬁrms and
observable to the econometrician, and it follows a ﬁrst order Markov process. The parameters θRS
and θRN measure the sensitivity of variable proﬁts to market size and to the number of active
competitors, respectively.28 Total current proﬁts of an active ﬁrm are:







− θFC,i− θEC,i(1 − aim,t−1)+εimt(1) (26)
where θFC,i−εimt is ﬁrm i’s ﬁx e do p e r a t i n gc o s tw h i c hh a st w oc o m p o n e n t s :θFC,i is time-invariant
and common knowledge, and εimt(1) is private information of ﬁrm i and time-varying. The term
(1 − ai,t−1)θEC,i is an entry cost, where the entry cost parameter θEC,i is multiplied by (1 − ai,t−1)
since this cost is paid only by entrants. If a ﬁrm does not operate its store, it can put its capital
to other uses. Current proﬁts of a non-active ﬁrm, Uimt(0), are equal to the value of the best
outside opportunity. We assume that Uimt(0) = εimt(0), which is private information of ﬁrm
i. The choice-speciﬁc private information variables, εimt(0) and εimt(1), are transitory normally
28One may interpret variable proﬁts as the equilibrium payoﬀs of a one-period static game in which ﬁrms with
identical products and variable costs compete in quantities (i.e., Cournot).
22distributed shocks, iid across ﬁrms, markets and time with zero mean.29
The vector of state variables of the game which are observable to the researcher is xmt =
(Smt,a mt−1) where amt−1 = {ami,t−1 : i =1 ,2,...,N} are indicators of incumbency status. Incum-
bency status matters because incumbent ﬁr m sd on o tp a ye n t r yc o s t sa n da r et h u sm o r el i k e l yt o
operate their store than non-incumbents. The unobservable state variables are the private infor-
mation shocks εimt. In this game, a ﬁrm’s strategy function, αi(xmt,ε imt), is a binary decision rule.
The associated conditional choice probability, Pα
i (1|xmt), is the probability that the ﬁrm operates
in the market.
Aguirregabiria and Mira estimate this model using panel data of Chilean local retail markets.
They assume that all potential entrants in each market are identical and consider symmetric equi-
libria.30 They estimate the model separately for ﬁve diﬀerent retail industries and analyze how
economies of scale, the sensitivity of proﬁts to the number of active ﬁrms and the magnitude of
sunk costs contribute to explain diﬀerences in the number of active ﬁrms across industries. As we
describe in section 4, Aguirregabiria and Mira relax Assumption OC by including a time-invariant
and market-speciﬁc component of market proﬁtability that is common knowledge for ﬁrms but
unobserved to the researcher They ﬁnd that this unobserved market heterogeneity is important.
Failure to account for it may lead to implausible estimates of the parameter θRN which measures
the sensitivity of proﬁts to the number of active competitors, because more proﬁtable markets tend
to have a larger number of active ﬁrms in equilibrium. ¥
The estimation of dynamic games, relative to single agent models, poses several speciﬁcp r o b -
lems. Simple as this example is, it illustrates how the size of the game’s state space tends to grow
exponentially with the number of players if it includes player-speciﬁc state variables such as incum-
bency status. As in the competitive equilibrium example, solving the model nests two levels of ﬁxed
point problems, i.e., the best response equilibrium condition and the individual player’s dynamic
programming problem. In order to alleviate the computational complexity, one might attempt to
estimate structural parameters from each player’s individual decision problem and actions. But
the decision rule depends on the (lagged) actions of other players, such as their incumbency sta-
tus. If some aggregate state variables are unobservable (e.g., the permanent component of market
proﬁtability), other player’s actions are endogenous.31 For given parameter values, multiple equi-
29We might write the value of the best outside oppotunity as μi+εimt(0), but the parameter μi cannot be identiﬁed
separately from the average ﬁxed cost θFC,i so we normalize it to zero.
30Therefore, θFC,iand θEC,i i st h es a m ef o ra l lﬁrms. Aguirregabiria, Mira and Roman (2007) relax this assumption.
We discuss the issue of ﬁrm permanent unobserved heterogeneity in section 4.
31And, furthermore, an initial conditions problem has to be taken into account.
23libria are a (likely) possibility which will make the empirical model indeterminate and call for some
additional structure.
On a diﬀerent level, note that example 4 is diﬀerent from the ﬁrst three in that only choice
data are used in estimation. In the ﬁrst three examples, data on payoﬀs( i . e . ,w a g e s )w a sa l s o
available. ’Pure choice’ data is a fairly common situation which tends to make estimation simpler
because payoﬀ data are often choice-censored and corrections for selection can be more diﬃcult
to implement in structural models, as we will see for example 2. On the other hand, it is clear
that availability of payoﬀ data is an important source of identiﬁcation. Furthermore, the basic
framework that we have described for empirical discrete games is easily extended to the case in
which payoﬀ variables satisfy assumption CI-Y.
3 Estimation methods for single agent models
3.1 Methods for Rust’s model
We introduced Rust’s model as a single agent model with the conditional independence and additive
separability assumptions. We describe four methods/algorithms which have been applied to the
estimation of this class of models: (1) the nested ﬁxed point algorithm; (2) Hotz-Miller’s CCP
method; (3) recursive CCP method; and (4) Hotz-Miller with simulation. The ﬁrst of these is a full
solution method, i.e., the DP-problem is solved for every trial value of the parameters. Methods
(2)-(4) avoid repeated full solutions of the DP problem, taking advantage of the existence of an
invertible mapping between conditional choice probabilities and diﬀerences in choice-speciﬁcv a l u e
functions, a result due to Hotz and Miller (1993). We have noted that almost all applications in
models with more than two choice alternatives have also imposed the extreme value assumption
on unobservables. Although the extreme value assumption per se is not essential for the statistical
properties of the model and the methods which we review here, it leads to closed form expressions
for several of the econometric model’s key objects. This is an advantage which these methods fully
exploit, specially (2)-(4). Extending the range of applicability of these methods to models which
do not impose the extreme value assumption is a topic for further research.
3.1.1 Nested ﬁxed point algorithm
The nested ﬁxed point algorithm (NFXP) is a gradient iterative search method to obtain the max-
imum likelihood estimator of the structural parameters. More speciﬁcally, this algorithm combines
a BHHH method (outer algorithm), that searches for a root of the likelihood equations, with a
24value function or policy iteration method (inner algorithm), that solves the dynamic programming
problem for each trial value of the structural parameters. The algorithm is initialized with an
arbitrary vector of structural parameters, say ˆ θ0. A BHHH iteration is deﬁned as:
ˆ θk+1 = ˆ θk +
µXN





where Oli(θ) is the gradient in θ of the log-likelihood function for individual i.G i v e nt h ef o r mo f
the likelihood in equation (10), and that θ =( θ0
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The terms OθY logfY and Oθf logfx are standard because the transition probability function and
the payoﬀ function are primitives of the model. However, to obtain Oθ logP we need to solve the
DP problem for θ = ˆ θk in order to compute the conditional choice probabilities and their derivatives
with respect to the components of ˆ θk.T h e r e a r e d i ﬀerent ways to solve the DP problem. When
the model has ﬁnite horizon (i.e., T is ﬁnite) the standard approach is to use backward induction.
For inﬁnite horizon models, one can use either value function iterations (described below) or policy
function iterations, or an hybrid of both.
To illustrate this algorithm in more detail, consider a version of Rust’s DP conditional logit
model with inﬁnite horizon, and discrete observable state variables x.L e t¯ V(θ) be the column
vector of values {¯ V (x,θ):x ∈ X}. Following equation (12), this vector of values can be obtained
as the unique ﬁxed point in ¯ V of the following Bellman equation in vector form:




u(a,θ)+β Fx(a) ¯ V
ª¶
(29)
where u(a,θ) is the vector of utilities {u(a,x,θ):x ∈ X} and Fx(a) is the transition probability











where Fx(a,x) is the column vector {fx(x0|a,x):x0 ∈ X}. To obtain the gradient Oθ logPit of
this DP-conditional logit model, it is useful to take into account that the denominator in equation
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25The expression for OθY logPit is equivalent to that of Oθu logPit. And given the Bellman equation




































where P(a|θ) is the column vector of choice probabilities {P(a|x,θ):x ∈ X},a n d∗ represents the
element-by-element product. Note that we obtain the gradient of the value functions in a relatively
simple manner as a by-product of the iterative DP solution method. This is an important additional
advantage of the DP-conditional logit speciﬁcation. Without it, it would be necessary to ’perturb’
each element of θ and obtain new solutions of the DP model for each perturbation in order to
compute numerical derivatives, which is much more costly.32
The NFXP algorithm proceeds as follows. We start with an arbitrary value of θ,s a yˆ θ0.G i v e n
ˆ θ0, in the ’inner’ algorithm we obtain the vector ¯ V(ˆ θ0) by successive iterations in the Bellman equa-
tion (29): starting with some guess ¯ V0, we iterate in ¯ Vh+1 =l o g (
PJ
a=0 exp{u(a,ˆ θ0)+β Fx(a)¯ Vh})
until convergence. Then, given ˆ θ0 and ¯ V(ˆ θ0) we construct the choice probabilities P(a|x,ˆ θ0) using
the formula in (30), the matrix ∂ ¯ V(ˆ θ0)/∂θ0using (32), and the gradient Oli(ˆ θ0) using equation (31).
Finally, in the ’outer’ algorithm we use the gradient Oli(ˆ θ0) to make a new BHHH iteration to
obtain ˆ θ1. We proceed in this way until the distance between ˆ θk+1 and ˆ θk or the diﬀerence in the
likelihoods is smaller than a pre-speciﬁed convergence constant. When the model has ﬁnite horizon,
we can solve for the value function, its gradient and choice probabilities using backward induction
in the inner algorithm of the NFXP. That is, the sequence of value vectors at ages T, T −1, etc, can
be obtained starting with ¯ VT(ˆ θ)=l o g (
PJ
a=0 exp{uT(a,ˆ θ)}), and then using the recursive formula
¯ Vt(ˆ θ)=l o g (
PJ
a=0 exp{ut(a,ˆ θ)+βFx,t(a)¯ Vt+1(ˆ θ)}) for t ≤ T−1. At each iteration the choice prob-
abilities are Pt(a|ˆ θ)=e x p {ut(a,ˆ θ)+β Fx,t(a)0¯ Vt+1(ˆ θ)} / [
PJ
j=0 exp{ut(j,ˆ θ)+β Fx,t(j)0¯ Vt+1(ˆ θ)}],
and the gradients have the following recursive forms ∂ ¯ Vt(ˆ θ)/∂θ0
u =
PJ
a=0 Pt(a|ˆ θ)∗{∂ut(a,ˆ θ)/∂θ0
u+
βFx,t(a) ∂ ¯ Vt+1(ˆ θ)/∂θ0
u} and ∂ ¯ Vt(ˆ θ)/∂θ0
f = β
PJ
a=0 Pt(a|ˆ θ) ∗ {∂Fx,t(a)/∂θ0
f ¯ Vt+1(ˆ θ)+βb Fx,t(a)
∂ ¯ Vt+1(ˆ θ)/∂θ0
f}.
As any other gradient method, the NFXP algorithm returns a solution to the likelihood equa-
tions. In general, the likelihood function of this class of models is not globally concave. Therefore,
32If policy iteration is used to solve the inﬁnite horizon DP model, the gradient of the value function can also be
obtained as a by-product. The computational cost of computing numerical derivatives is the main reason why BHHH,
which avoids second derivatives, is paricularly useful in the estimation of structural models.
26some global search is necessary to check whether the root of the likelihood equations that has been
found is actually the global maximum and not just a local optimum.
We have described the NFXP algorithm in the context of full information MLE (FIML). How-
ever, most applications of this algorithm have considered a sequential partial likelihood approach
ﬁrst advocated by Rust. In the ﬁrst step, the partial likelihoods
P
i,t logfY (yit|ait,x it,θY ) and
P
i,t logfx(xi,t+1|ait,x it,θf) are maximized to obtain estimates of parameters θY and θf,r e s p e c -
tively. This step does not involve solving the DP problem. Given these estimators, in the second
step the parameters in θu are estimated using the NFXP algorithm and the partial likelihood
P
i,t logP(ait|xit,θu,ˆ θY ,ˆ θf). This two-step approach can greatly simplify the estimation problem
in models with many parameters in the transition probabilities. It was used by Rust and Phe-
lan (1997) to estimate the model that we described in Example 1. In that application, the state
variables with stochastic transitions were health status, health expenses, marital status and public
pension points. The payoﬀ function is the labor earnings equation. There are two main reasons why
this sequential approach reduces the cost of estimating these and other models. First, the number
of BHHH iterations needed to reach convergence typically increases with the number of parameters
that are estimated. Note that BHHH iterations here a r ep a r t i c u l a r l yc o s t l yb e c a u s et h e yi n v o l v et h e
full solution of the dynamic programming problem. And second, the computational cost associated
with a global search increase as well with the dimension of the parameter space. Nevertheless, it
should be noted that in the sequential partial likelihood approach the calculation of standard errors
in the second step correcting for estimation error in the ﬁrst step is not a trivial task. It is often
no more costly to consider a third estimation step consisting of a single FIML-BHHH iteration,
which as is well known delivers an asymptotically eﬃcient estimator as well as the correct standard
errors.
There is a long list of applications which have used the NFXP algorithm to estimate models in
Rust’s class. For instance: investment models of machine replacement, as in Rust (1987), Sturm
(1991), Das (1992), Kennet (1993 and 1994), and Rust and Rothwell (1995); or models of retirement
from the labor force, as in Rust and Phelan (1997), and Karlstrom, Palme and Svensson (2004).
3.1.2 Hotz-Miller’s CCP estimator
The main advantages of the NFXP algorithm are its conceptual simplicity and, more importantly,
that it gives the MLE which is asymptotically eﬃcient under the assumptions of the model. The
main limitation of this algorithm is its computational cost. In particular, the DP problem has to be
solved exactly for each trial value of the structural parameters. Given the cost of solving some DP
27problems, this characteristic of the algorithm limits the range of applications that are feasible, even
in the DP-conditional logit case. Hotz and Miller (1993) observed that, under the assumptions
of Rust model, it is not necessary to solve the DP problem even once in order to estimate the
structural parameters A key idea in their method is that, using nonparametric estimates of choice
and transition probabilities, it is possible to obtain a simple representation of the choice-speciﬁc
value functions v(a,x,θ) for values of θ around the true vector of structural parameters (see also
Manski, 1993, for a method that exploits a similar idea). This representation is particularly simple
and useful for estimation in the DP-conditional logit model with linear-in-parameters utility. We
assume that u(a,xit,θu)=z(a,xit)0θu,w h e r ez(a,xit) is a vector of known functions. We describe
Hotz-Miller’s method in detail for this case but we also include a brief discussion of alternative
speciﬁcations, including the nonlinear DP-conditional logit case which corresponds to the model in
Example 1.33 Furthermore, we assume that the dataset does not include payoﬀ variables or, if it
does, assumption CI-Y holds and θY has been estimated and subsumed into the known z functions.
In Hotz and Miller’s representation the choice-speciﬁc value functions are written as follows:34
v(a,x,θ)=˜ z(a,x,θ) θu +˜ e(a,x,θ) (33)
where ˜ z(a,x,θ) is the expected and discounted sum of current and future z vectors {z(at+j,x t+j):
j =0 ,1,2,...} which may occur along all possible histories originating from (at,x t)=( a,x);a n d




















where Ext+j|at=a,xt(.) represents the expectation over the distribution of xt+j conditional to (at =
a,xt). This expectation is calculated under the assumption that the individual behaves optimally
in the future and, therefore, state variables evolve as a controlled stochastic process deﬁned by
optimal choice probabilities and transition probability functions. e(a,xt) is the expectation of εt(a)
33Alternatively, a linear utility z(a,xit)
0θu can also be interpreted as a ﬁrst order Taylor approximation to a
nonlinear utility.
34Hotz-Miller’s representation can be derived either for alternative-speciﬁc value functions or for the integrated
value function (Emax function). We have preferred to use the ﬁrst version here. Also note that for problems with
terminal actions Hotz and Miller derived a diﬀerent representation of alternative-speciﬁc value functions which is
simpler than the general representation that we present here. The estimator based on this alternative representation
has diﬀerent asymptotic variance and it has been used less often.
28conditional on xt a n do na l t e r n a t i v ea being optimal, i.e., e(a,xt) ≡ E(εt(a)|xt,α(xt,ε t)=a).H o t z
and Miller showed that e(a,xt) is a function of a, the probabilities P(.|xt,θ), and the distribution
Gε only.35 The particular functional form of e(a,x) depends on the probability distribution Gε.
When the ε0s a r ei i de x t r e m ev a l u e ,e(a,x) has a closed-form and is equal to Euler’s constant minus
logP(a|x,θ).N o t et h a t˜ z(a,xt,θ) and ˜ e(a,xt,θ) depend on θ only through the parameters in the
transition probabilities, θf, and the vector of CCPs P(θ)={P(a|x,θ):( a,x) ∈ A × X}. In fact,
we can deﬁne ˜ z and ˜ e for an arbitrary vector of CCPs (optimal or not). To emphasize this point




a0=0 P(a0|xt+j) z(a0,x t+j)] and




a0=0 P(a0|xt+j) e(a0,x t+j)].36
Let θ0 =( θ0
u,θ0
f) be the true value of θ in the population of individuals under study. And let P0
be the conditional choice probabilities in the population. If we knew (P0,θ0
f), we could construct
the values ˜ zP0
(a,x) and ˜ eP0
(a,x) and then use Hotz and Miller’s representation to approximate the
choice-speciﬁcv a l u e sv(a,x,θ) as simple linear functions of θu close to its true value. Although we
do not know (P0,θ0
f), we can estimate them consistently without having to solve the DP problem.
Consistent estimates of transition probabilities can be obtained using a (partial) MLE of θ0
f that
maximizes the (partial) likelihood
P
i,t logfx(xi,t+1|ait,x it,θf). Conditional choice probabilities
can be estimated using nonparametric regression methods (i.e., P0(a|x)=E(I{ait = a}|xit = x))
such as a Nadaraya-Watson kernel estimator or a simple frequency estimator. Let ˆ P and ˆ θf be
the estimators of P0 and θ0
f, respectively. Based on these estimates, Hotz and Miller’s idea is to
approximate v(a,xit,θ) by ˜ z
ˆ P(a,xit)θu +˜ e
ˆ P(a,xit) in order to obtain the CCP ’ si ne q u a t i o n( 3 0 ) .
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=0 (35)
35To see this, note that the event {α(x,ε)=a} is equivalent to {v(a,x)+ε(a) ≥ v(a
0,x)+ε(a







0) − ε(a) ≤ v(a,x) − v(a
0,x) ∀a
0 6= a}dG(ε). The last expression shows that
e(a,x) depends on the primitives of the model only through the probability distribution of ε and the vector of value
diﬀerences ˜ v(x) ≡ {v(a,x)−v(0,x):a ∈ A}. The vector of choice probabilities {P(a|x):a ∈ A} is also a function of
Gε and ˜ v(x), i.e., P(a|x)=P r ( ε(a
0)−ε(a) ≤ v(a,x)−v(a
0,x) ∀a
0 6= a|x). Hotz and Miller showed that this mapping
that relates choice probabilities and value diﬀerences is invertible (see Proposition 1, page 501, in Hotz and Miller,
1993).
36For notational simplicity we omit θf as an argument, though it should be clear that ˜ z
P(a,xt) and ˜ e
P(a,xt)
depend on P and θf.
29where H(xit) is a matrix with dimension dim(θu) × J with functions of xit which are used as
instruments.
The main advantage of this estimator is its computational simplicity. Nonparametric estimation
of choice probabilities is a (relatively) simple task. The main task is the computation of the
values ˜ z
ˆ P(a,xit) and ˜ e
ˆ P(a,xit). We provide more details on the calculation of these expected
and discounted values below. However, these values are calculated just once and remain ﬁxed
in the search for the Hotz-Miller estimator. In contrast, in a full solution method such as the
NFXP algorithm these values are recomputed exactly for each trial value of θ. Thus Hotz-Miller’s
method greatly reduces the computational burden of NFXP’s ’inner’ algorithm. Another important
advantage of Hotz-Miller’s CCP estimator is that, for the DP conditional logit model with linear-
in-parameters utility, the system of equations (35) that deﬁnes the estimator has a unique solution.
Therefore, a global search is not needed.
Previous conventional wisdom was that Hotz-Miller’s estimator achieved a signiﬁcant com-
putational gain at the expense of eﬃciency, both in ﬁnite samples and asymptotically. Thus,
researchers had the choice between two extremes: a full solution NFXP-ML estimator with the at-
tendant computational burden, or the much faster but less eﬃcient Hotz-Miller estimator. However,
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) showed that a pseudo maximum likelihood version of Hotz-Miller’s
estimator is asymptotically equivalent to partial MLE. The ’two-step’ pseudo maximum likelihood
(PML) estimator is deﬁned as the value of θu that maximizes the pseudo likelihood function:37
















ˆ P(a,xit)θu +˜ e
ˆ P(a,xit)
o (36)
The asymptotic variance of this two-step PML estimator is just equal to the variance of the partial
MLE of θu described at the end of section 3.1.1. That is, the initial nonparametric estimator of P0
and the PML estimator of θ0
u are asymptotically independent and therefore there is no asymptotic
eﬃciency loss from using an ineﬃcient initial estimator of P0. Nevertheless, although the two-step
PML estimator is asymptotically equivalent to p a r t i a lM L E ,M o n t eC a r l oe x p e r i m e n t ss h o wt h a t
its ﬁnite sample bias can be much larger.38 Imprecise initial estimates of choice probabilities do
not aﬀect the asymptotic properties of the estimator, but they can generate serious small sample
biases in the two-step PML estimator and, more generally, in the whole class of Hotz-Miller’s CCP
37It is well known that the PML estimator belongs to the class of GMM estimators deﬁned in equation (35). More
speciﬁcally, the PML estimator is the GMM estimator with a matrix of instruments H(xit) equal to the pseudo
scores.
38See the Monte Carlo experiments in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002 and 2007), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler
(2007), and Kasahara and Shimotsu (2006).
30estimators.39 The source of this bias is well understood in two-step methods: ˆ P enters nonlinearly
in the sample moment conditions that deﬁne the estimator, and the expected value of a nonlinear
function of ˆ P is not equal to that function evaluated at the expected value of ˆ P.T h e l a r g e r
the variance of ˆ P, the larger the bias of ˆ θu. The variance of the nonparametric estimator of
P0(a|x)=E(I{ait = a}|xit = x) increases with the number of cells in the set X. In applications
with millions of cells in X and a few thousand observations, the variance of ˆ P and the bias of ˆ θu
can be very large. A recursive extension of the two-step method, which we describe in the next
subsection, deals with this problem.
We now describe in some detail on the computation of the values ˜ zP(a,xt) and ˜ eP(a,xt).W e
start with the case of a ﬁnite horizon model, i.e., T<∞. W ec a no b t a i nt h es e q u e n c eo fv a l u e s
{˜ zP
t (a,xt) and ˜ eP
t (a,xt):t =1 ,2,...,T} using backwards induction. Starting at the last period, we
have ˜ z
ˆ P
T (a,xT)=z(a,xT) and ˜ e
ˆ P



























The computational burden incurred to obtain these values is equivalent to that of solving the ﬁnite
horizon DP problem. For models with inﬁnite horizon, these values can be obtained by using




z (x0) and ˜ eP(a,x)=β
P
x0∈X fx(x0|a,x) WP
e (x0),w h e r eWP
z (.) is a 1 × dim(θu) vector and
WP
e (.) is a scalar and both are (basis functions for) valuation operators. Deﬁne the matrix WP ≡
{[WP
z (x),WP
e (x)] : x ∈ X}. Then, the valuation basis WP is deﬁned as the unique solution in W
to the following contraction mapping:
W =
XJ
a=0 P(a) ∗ {[z(a),e(a)]+β Fx(a) W} (38)
where P(a) is the column vector of choice probabilities {P(a|x):x ∈ X}; z(a)={z(a,x):x ∈ X};
and e(a) ≡ {e(a,x):x ∈ X}.40 Again, the computational cost to obtain these values is equivalent
to solving once the inﬁnite horizon DP problem. Note that (38) is a linear system, so there is a
39As pointed out by Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2007), the bias of CCP estimators can be smaller when the





e (x) is the expected discounted utility of behaving according to choice probabilities P from current
period t and into the inﬁnite future when xt = x. See Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) for more detail.
31closed form expression for WP, i.e., WP =( I − β
PJ
a=0 P(a) ∗ Fx(a))−1 PJ
a=0 P(a) ∗ [z(a),e(a)].
When the number of cells in X is small enough, matrix inversion algorithms may be preferable to
successive approximations.41
Our description of the CCP method has sofar assumed that the utility function is linear in
parameters and that there is a closed form expression for the e() function. We now discuss brieﬂy
the role of these assumptions. First, if the utility is not linear-in-parameters, we can represent the
choice-speciﬁcv a l u ev(a,x,θ) as ˜ zP(a,x,θu)+˜ eP(a,x),w h e r eθu is now an argument in ˜ zP().A l l
the previous expression for ˜ zP and ˜ eP s t i l la p p l yi fw er e p l a c ez(a,x) by z(a,x,θu) and WP
z (x)
by WP
z (x,θu).T h e m a t r i x WP is now {[WP
z (x,θu),WP
e (x)] : x ∈ X} which uniquely solves the
system W =
PJ
a=0 P(a) ∗ {[z(a,θu),e(a)]+β Fx(a) W}. For each trial value of θu the terms
PJ
a=0 P(a)∗z(a,θu) do have to be recomputed and premultiplied by rows of the ’weighting’ inverse
matrix. This increases signiﬁcantly the computational cost relative to a model with a linear-
in-parameters utility. However, the inverse matrix (I − β
PJ
a=0 P(a) ∗ Fx(a))−1 only has to be
computed once and collects a large part of the calculations involved in valuation.42 Second, the
e(a,x) function has a straightforward expression when the ε0s have independent extreme value
distributions, as well as in binary choice models when unobservables have normal or exponential
distributions (see Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Pakes et al (2007) for examples). However,
in multinomial models without extreme value unobservables, e() does not have a closed form and
would have to be computed numerically or by simulation. Furthermore, in general e() might depend
nonlinearly on unknown parameters and would have to be recomputed for diﬀerent trial values of
the parameters. Therefore, relaxing the logistic assumption in the multinomial case represents an
important complication for all methods which rely on Hotz-Miller’s invertibility result and their
usefulness in that setting remains an open question. Finally, it should also be noted that all the
methods that use Hotz-Miller’s representation of value functions are based on the two-step partial
likelihood approach and do not estimate the discount factor directly. To see why, recall that
the valuation operator relies on previously obtained consistent estimates of the parameters θf of
transition probability functions. Without these, the present values ˜ zP and ˜ eP would have to be
recomputed repeatedly for diﬀerent values of θf and β in the in the second step, rather than just
once, and most of the computational advantage of the Hotz-Miller approach would be lost.
41The matrix (I − βF)
−1 can be also approximated using the series I + βF + β
2F
2 + ... + β
KF
K,w i t hK large
enough. This can be easier than matrix inversion. More generally, this inverse matrix can be obtained iterating in A
(succesive approximations) in the mapping A = I + βF A.
42This inverse matrix computes the expected number of times each state will be visited in the future, with each
visit weighted by the corresponding discount factor.
32An important limitation of Hotz-Miller’s CCP estimator and most of its extensions is that
consistency depends crucially on Assumption IID. If unobservables are serially correlated, or if there
is permanent unobserved heterogeneity as in the ﬁnite mixture model, consistent non parametric
estimates of CCP’s, an essential element of Hotz-Miller’s 2-step approach, cannot be obtained from
choice data.43 However, Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Aguirregabiria, Mira and Roman (2007)
and Arcidiacono and Miller (2006) have recently proposed and applied recursive versions of the
CCP estimator which provide consistent estimates for ﬁnite mixture models. Also, Kasahara and
Shimotsu (2006b) have shown than under certain conditions it is possible to obtain consistent
nonparametric estimators of CCPs in ﬁnite mixture models, which can be used to construct a
root-N consistent CCP estimator.
Some applications which have used the CCP estimator are: contraceptive choice, Hotz and
Miller (1993); price adjustment and inventories in retail ﬁrms, Slade (1998), Aguirregabiria (1999),
Kano (2006); and ﬁrms’ investment and labor demand, Sanchez-Mangas (2002) and Rota (2004).
3.1.3 Recursive CCP estimation (NPL)
Let ˆ θu be the two-step PML estimator of θ0
u that we have described above. Given this estima-












ˆ P(j,x) ˆ θu +˜ e
ˆ P(j,x)
o
.44 Given the new estimates ˆ P1
we can compute new values ˜ z
ˆ P1(a,xit) and ˜ e
ˆ P1(a,xit), a new pseudo likelihood function Q(θu, ˆ P1,ˆ θf),
and a new PML estimator that maximizes this function. We can iterate in this way to generate
a sequence of estimators of structural parameters and conditional choice probabilities {ˆ θu,K, ˆ PK :
K =1 ,2,...} such that for any K ≥ 1:
ˆ θu,K =a r gm a x
θu∈Θ













ˆ PK−1(j,x) ˆ θu,K +˜ e
ˆ PK−1(j,x)
o (40)
All the estimators in this sequence are asymptotically equivalent to partial MLE and to the two-step
PML (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2002, Proposition 4). Therefore, iterating in this procedure does
43Relatedly, note that Hotz-Miller’s approach also relies on a DGP such that all states are visited with positive
probability. This assumption may be problematic in life-cycle applications.
44Given parameter values, this expression deﬁnes an operator mapping from CCP’s into CCP’s. Aguirregabiria and
Mira (2002) show that this is a policy iteration operator and use it to characterize the solution of the DP problem in
the space of conditional choice probabilities. Also note that if unobserved state variables do not have extreme value
distribution, the mapping from choice-speciﬁc value functions to CCPs which is used in the policy iteration step in
(40) need not have a closed form.
33not give any asymptotic gain. However, it seems intuitive that if the pseudo likelihood is built from
estimates of choice probabilities that exploit the structure of the model one may get estimates of
structural parameters with smaller ﬁnite sample bias an variance. Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002)
present Monte Carlo experiments that illustrate how iterating in this procedure does in fact produce
signiﬁcant reductions in ﬁnite sample bias. Kasahara and Shimotsu (2006a) provide a proof of this
result using higher order expansions for the bias and variance of the sequence of PML estimators.
Aguirregabiria and Mira also show that upon convergence the recursive procedure gives, exactly, a
root of the likelihood equations. This result holds regardless of whether the initial estimator of P0
is consistent or not, and the procedure is called the nested pseudo likelihood algorithm (NPL).
Therefore, the NPL procedure can be seen both as a method to reduce the ﬁnite sample bias of
Hotz-Miller’s CCP estimator and as an algorithm to obtain the MLE. As a bias reduction method,
we do not have to iterate until convergence and the computational cost is clearly smaller than
NFXP. As an algorithm to obtain the MLE, it can also be computationally much cheaper than
NFXP. The example in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) suggests that this is likely to be the case in
inﬁnite horizon models when maximization in θu of the pseudo likelihood function is a simple task,
such as Rust’s DP-conditional logit model with a linear-in-parameters utility where the pseudo
likelihood is globally concave in θu.45 Applications of this method include: Aguirregabiria and
Alonso-Borrego (1999) on labor demand; Sanchez-Mangas (2002) and Lorincz (2005) on machine
replacement and ﬁrms’ investment; and Kano (2006) on price adjustments with menu costs.
3.1.4 Simulation-based Hotz-Miller estimator
Though Hotz-Miller’s CCP estimator is computationally much cheaper than NFXP, it is still im-
practical for applications where the dimension of the state space X is very large, e.g., a discrete
state space with millions of points or a model in which some of the observable state variables
are continuous. To deal with this problem, Hotz, Miller, Sanders and Smith (1994) propose an
extension of the Hotz-Miller estimator that uses simulation techniques to approximate the values
˜ z
ˆ P(a,x) and ˜ e
ˆ P(a,x). For every value of xit in the sample and every choice alternative a ∈ A (in
the sample or not), we consider (a,xit) as the initial state and generate R simulated paths of future
actions and state variables from period t+1to t+T∗ (i.e., T∗ periods ahead). We index simulated
paths by r ∈ {1,2,...,R}.T h e r − th simulated path associated with the initial state (a,xit) is
45Computational savings will be larger the smaller the number of NPL iterations relative to the number of trial
values of θu required by NFXP’s outer algorithm. Little is known about the relative merits of NPL and NFXP in










































Simulated paths are obtained using the initial estimates of choice and transition probabilities, ˆ P and
ˆ θf. The path is generated sequentially. Starting at the observed state xit and given the hypothetical
action a,t h es t a t en e x tp e r i o d ,x
(r,a)
i,t+1, is a random draw from the distribution fx(.|a,xit,ˆ θf). Then,
the action a
(r,a)
i,t+1 is a random draw from the distribution ˆ P(.|x
(r,a)











i,t+1,ˆ θf),a n da
(r,a)
i,t+2 is drawn from ˆ P(.|x
(r,a)
i,t+2).A n d
so on. Simulations are independent across the R paths. If the DP problem has ﬁnite horizon, or
if T∗ is large enough such that the approximation error associated with the truncation of paths is
negligible, then these simulators are unbiased. That is, for any number of simulations R we have
that ER(˜ z
ˆ P
R(a,xit))) = ˜ z
ˆ P(a,xit) and ER(˜ e
ˆ P
R(a,xit)) = ˜ e
ˆ P(a,xit),w h e r eER(.) is the expectation
over the simulation draws.
Hotz et al. propose an estimator that is root-N consistent for any number of simulations,
even with R =1 . This property of simulation-based estimators obtains when, in the system
of equations that deﬁne the estimator, the unbiased simulator enters linearly and averaged over
sample observations. This is not satisﬁed by the simulation versions of the GMM estimator in (35)
or of the PML estimator. Hotz et al consider a GMM estimator that exploits moment conditions
for the choice-speciﬁc value functions. Given that the mapping that relates choice-speciﬁcv a l u e
functions and choice probabilities is invertible (see Proposition 1 in Hotz and Miller, 1993), we
can represent the value diﬀerences v(a,x,θ) − v(0,x,θ) as functions of choice probabilities. For
the DP-conditional logit model, this inverse function has a very simple closed-form expression:
i.e., v(a,x,θ) − v(0,x,θ)=l o g ( P(a|x,θ)) − log(P(0|x,θ)). Based on this representation, we can

























where h(xit) is a vector of instruments with the same dimension as θu. These moment conditions
still hold if we replace the population parameters (P0,θ0
f) by consistent estimates, and the values
˜ z and ˜ e by the unbiased simulators ˜ zR and ˜ eR. Then, for the DP-conditional logit model, the






























This estimator has a closed form expression. In fact, the expression is the one of an IV estimator in
a linear regression model. It is clear that the simulation error averages out over the sample and does
not have any inﬂuence on the consistency or the rate of convergence of the estimator. However, the
simulation error aﬀects the variance of the estimator: as R goes to inﬁnity, the asymptotic variance
of this estimator converges to the variance of Hotz et al estimator without simulation. The later
is larger than the variance of the one-step PML estimator (i.e., the variance of MLE) because the
moment conditions in (42) are not the optimal ones.
Hotz et al. present several Mont Carlo experiments that illustrate that this estimator can have
large bias in small samples. To the ﬁnite sample bias of the Hotz-Miller estimator now we should
add the bias due to the simulation error. Despite these problems, this is a very interesting and
useful estimator. The estimator can be applied to models with continuous state variables and it
can be extended to deal with continuous decision variables as well. Altug and Miller (1998) applied
this method to estimate a model of female labor supply where the decision variable, hours of
work, is continuous and censored. Other applications include Miller and Sanders (1997) on welfare
participation, and Holliﬁeld, Miller and Sandas (2004) on limit orders markets.
3.2 Estimation of Eckstein-Keane-Wolpin models
Under the label ’Eckstein-Keane-Wolpin’ we grouped most applications which have not used Rust’s
DP-conditional logit model. Speciﬁcally, we listed the following four departures from that frame-
work: (1) Unobservables which do not satisfy assumption AS; (2) Observable but choice-censored
payoﬀ or state variables; (3) Permanent unobserved heterogeneity; (4) Unobservables which are cor-
related across choice alternatives. The prevalent estimation criterion for Eckstein-Keane-Wolpin
models has been FIML because the partial likelihood approach exploited in Rust’s framework does
not give consistent estimators under (2) and (3). The bulk of this section will address the esti-
mation of models allowing for (3) and (4), i.e., methods for ﬁnite mixtures of likelihoods (section
3.2.1) and Keane and Wolpin’s simulation and interpolation method (section 3.2.2). In the next
two paragraphs we brieﬂy discuss the estimation of models featuring (1) and (2).46
46Several of the seminal papers in this literature, such as Miller (1984), Wolpin (1984, 1987) and Pakes (1986),
precede Rust’s contribution and ’deviated’ from his framework. All these models considered binary choices and a
single unobservable state variable which resulted in a ’threshold’ decision rule.
36The main consequence of departing from AS is that the econometric model may not be satu-
rated. A discrete choice model is saturated if for any value of the observable state variables and
of the structural parameters the model predicts a strictly positive choice probability for any of the
choice alternatives. Non-saturation causes econometric and computational problems in maximum
likelihood estimation (see Rust, 1994). A natural way of dealing with this issue is to allow for
measurement error in the state and/or choice variables. Wolpin (1987) and Keane and Wolpin
(1997, 2001) are examples of this approach to deal with non-saturated models.
The problem with censored payoﬀ or state variables was illustrated in the occupational choice
model of Example 2, where wages are observed if individuals work but the distribution of wages
across occupations cannot be estimated consistently from wage data alone because observed wages
are a choice-censored sample. The full likelihood uses the structural behavioral model to correct
for sample selection bias.47
3.2.1 Finite mixture models (permanent unobserved heterogeneity)
The ﬁnite mixture framework and FIML estimation: Consider a more general version of the ﬁnite
mixture model introduced in Section 2, with permanent unobserved heterogeneity in the utility
function, payoﬀ function, and transition probabilities. Individuals in the population belong to one
of L unobserved types indexed by  . The vector ω  represents unobserved heterogeneity, and π |xi1
denotes the mass (to be estimated) of type   individuals conditional on the individual’s initial
value of the state variables. We distinguish three components in ω ,i . e . ,ω  =( ω 
u,ω 
Y ,ω 
f),w h i c h
correspond to heterogeneity in utility, payoﬀ and transition rules, respectively. In example 2 there
is heterogeneity in utility and payoﬀs but not in transition probabilities because the laws of mo-
tion of schooling and experience are deterministic. The set of structural parameters consists of:
π = {π |x :   =1 ,2,...,L;x ∈ X}; the set of values Ω = {ω  :   =1 ,2,...,L}; and the vector θ =( θu,
θY ,θf), that is invariant across types. As we presented in section 2, the contribution of agent i
to the conditional log-likelihood in this mixture model is li(θ,Ω,π)=l o g (
PL
 =1 π |xi1 Li(θ,ω )),
where Li(θ,ω ) is
QTi
t=1 P(ait|xit,ω ,θ) fY (yit|ait,x it,ω 
Y ,θ)
QTi−1
t=1 fx(xi,t+1|ait,x it,ω 
f,θf). Condi-
tional on type, the likelihood factors into conditional choice probabilities, payoﬀ probabilities, and
state transition probabilities as in Rust’s model. However, unlike the log-likelihood in (10), this
47There are approaches other than FIML to estimate consistently the wage equation controlling for selection. For
instance, the model can provide exclusion restrictions (i.e., variables that aﬀect occupational choice but not wages)
which can be used to estimate the wage equation using a Heckman two-step method. The ﬁrst step of this method
is a reduced form ﬁnite-mixture, multinomial probit model for occupational choice where the vector of explanatory
variables consists of the terms of a polynomial in xit.
37log-likelihood is not additively separable because the type proportions appear inside the log.48 Con-
sistent estimates of θY and θf cannot be obtained separately because agents’ choices, which appear
in the payoﬀ and transition probabilities, are not independent of the individual unobserved types.
FIML estimation corrects the endogeneity bias. This approach to allow for persistent individual
heterogeneity is based on the seminal work by Heckman and Singer (1984).
The computational cost of estimation may be much larger than in a similar model without
permanent unobserved heterogeneity because the likelihood of the choice history is maximized in
the full parameter vector and furthermore the number of times the DP problem needs to be solved
is multiplied by the number of types. As noted before this is the reason why ﬁnite mixtures are
used and the number of types is kept small. Following Heckman and Singer, if L is unknown the
number of types can be estimated by increasing L until the likelihood at the FIML estimates ’does
not increase’. However, this search is expensive and typically L is set a priori. One should be
careful not to choose a large value for L.I ft h ev a l u eo fL in the estimated model is larger than
its true value in the population, the model is not identiﬁed (e.g., there are multiple combinations
of the π |xi1 parameters that can explain the data equally well). This is another reason why most
applications have considered a small number of types.
Sequential EM algorithm (ESM): Arcidiacono and Jones (2003) propose a clever algorithm which
makes the two-step partial likelihood approach compatible with the ﬁnite mixture model. Their
insight is that additive separability of the log-likelihood, which is the basis for the two-step partial
likelihood strategy, can be recovered in a ’multi-cycle’ or ’sequential’ version of the well known
Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm. A key element of Arcidiacono and Jones’ ESM algo-
rithm is the ’posterior’ probability that individual i belongs to unobserved type   given her observed
history of choices and states. For the sake of simplicity, ignore for the moment the initial conditions
problem and assume that π |xi1 = π . We also assume that conditional on type, Rust’s assumption
CI-Y holds, i.e., conditional on type the payoﬀ function yit is independent of the transitory shocks
εit.L e te ai, e xi and ˜ yi be individual i’s histories of actions, states, and payoﬀ variables, respectively.
From Bayes’ theorem this is
Pr( |e ai, e xi, ˜ yi;θ,Ω,π)=
π  Pr(e ai,e xi, ˜ yi |  ;θ,π)
Pr(e ai, e xi, ˜ yi | θ,Ω,π)
=
π  Li(θ,ω )
exp{li(θ,Ω,π)}
(44)
where the functions Li(θ,ω ) and li(θ,Ω,π) a r et h el i k e l i h o o d st h a tw eh a v ed e ﬁned in equation
(16). It can be shown that the FIML estimator (ˆ θ, ˆ Ω, ˆ π) that maximizes the likelihood function
48If there is not permanent unobserved heterogeneity in the transition probabilities, then we can write the full
likelihood as the sum of two partial likelihoods and θf can be still estimated consistently by maximizing the partial
likelihood associated with transition data and without solving the DP problem.
38(16) satisﬁes the following conditions:




i=1 Pr(  | e ai, e xi, ˜ yi;ˆ θ, ˆ Ω, ˆ π)





 =1 Pr(  | e ai,e xi, ˜ yi;ˆ θ, ˆ Ω, ˆ π)l o g Li(θ,ω )
(45)
Condition (a) is quite intuitive since it states that unconditional type proportions and individual
posterior probabilities have to be mutually consistent. Condition (b) states that (ˆ θ, ˆ Ω) also maxi-
mizes a mixture of log-likelihoods, weighted by posterior type probabilities. In this maximization
the posterior weights are kept ﬁxed and appear outside the logs, so the mixture of log likelihoods
is once again separable in choice, payoﬀ and state transition factors.
These properties motivate Arcidiacono and Jones’ sequential version of the EM algorithm.
The algorithm is initialized with an arbitrary vector {ˆ θ0, ˆ Ω0, ˆ π0} in the space of the structural
parameters. Given {ˆ θ0, ˆ Ω0, ˆ π0} we obtain a new vector {ˆ θ1, ˆ Ω1, ˆ π1} as follows:
“E” step: Compute Pi 0 ≡ Pr( |e ai,e xi, ˜ yi;ˆ θ0, ˆ Ω0, ˆ π0) as ˆ π 0Li(ˆ θ0, ˆ ω 
0)/exp{li(ˆ θ0, ˆ Ω0, ˆ π0)}.
Sequential “M” step: For {Pi 0} ﬁxed, obtain {ˆ θ1, ˆ Ω1, ˆ π1} using:
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(b3) (ˆ θu1, ˆ ω 
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f1,θu,,ˆ θY 1,ˆ θf1)
#
Then, use {ˆ θ1, ˆ Ω1, ˆ π1} as the initial value and apply the “E” step and the sequential "M" step
again. We proceed until convergence in {ˆ θ, ˆ Ω, ˆ π}. Arcidiacono and Jones show that, if the algorithm
converges, it obtains consistent and asymptotically normal estimators. These estimators are not
asymptotically eﬃcient because the sequential partial likelihood approach is used in every M-step.
The algorithm requires multiple maximization steps, but each of them may be much less costly
than full information maximization. Arcidiacono and Jones illustrate their method in a Monte
Carlo experiment based on a model of schooling choices. In their experiments, the ESM delivers
estimators much faster than FIML, with a small loss of precision.
39Initial conditions: As illustrated in Example 2, if the model has permanent unobserved heterogene-
ity then the ﬁrst observation xi1 on which the likelihood is conditioned is potentially an endogenous
variable because it is not independent of the individual’s type: i.e., π |xi1 ≡ Pr( |xi1) 6=P r (  ).F o l -
lowing Heckman (1981), there are two standard solutions to this problem. The ﬁrst solution, which
has been the most common approach in life-cycle models, is to complement the conditional likeli-
hood derived from the structural DP model with an auxiliary model for the distribution of types
conditional on the initial value of the state variables. A suﬃciently ﬂexible multinomial logit model









where θπ ≡ {θπ,  :   =1 ,2,...,L− 1} is a vector of parameters to estimate, and θπ,L is normalized
to zero. This seems like the most reasonable approach if the researcher thinks that the structural
model does not apply to pre-sample periods. For instance, in Keane-Wolpin occupational choice
model, the authors did not believe that their structural model explained schooling at age 16, but
still treated this variable as endogenous.
In the second approach, it is assumed that the structural behavioral model explains the dis-
tribution of the initial values of the state variables. Consider again Keane-Wolpin’s occupational
choice model. The initial age in their data and model (i.e., t =1 )i s16 years old. For the
sake of illustration, suppose that at some out-of-sample age lower than 16 (i.e., t0 < 1) the
state variables took the same value for all individuals. That is, all the individuals at age t0
have the same level of formal education and the same (zero) labor market experience. There-
fore, for every individual i, xit0 = x0 where x0 is known to the researcher. Also, assume that
individuals’ choice probabilities at ages in the sample (i.e., t ≥ 1) can be extrapolated to ages
younger than 16. Then, given the choice probabilities of the structural model, we can obtain
the probabilities Pr(xi1|xit0 = x0,ω ,θ) for every type   and every value xi1 in the sample. By
Bayes rule, π |xi1 = π  Pr(xi1|x0,ω ,θ)/
PL
 0=1 π 0 Pr(xi1|x0,ω 0
,θ). Therefore, given the proba-
bilities Pr(xi1|x0,ω ,θ), we can construct the conditional log-likelihood function log(
PL
 =1 π |xi1
Li(θ,ω )), where now the vector of parameters π contains the unconditional mass probabilities of
each type {π  :   =1 ,2,...,L}, which are primitive parameters of the structural model and are es-
timated together with θ. The key assumption for the validity of this approach is the extrapolation
of choice probabilities for periods t<1. If this assumption is correct, this ”structural” approach to
deal with the initial conditions problem provides more eﬃcient estimates of the structural parame-
ters than the ﬁrst, ”reduced form” approach. However, the approach has two important limitations:
40it is computationally much more intensive, and it relies on out-of-sample extrapolations which may
be not realistic in some applications.
In some applications some individuals’ histories may be left-censored which implies that individ-
uals have diﬀerent initial periods. For instance, in Keane and Wolpin’s occupational choice model
suppose we do not observe all the individuals since age 16 but from very diﬀerent initial ages, e.g.,
age 24, 28, etc. If we use the ”reduced form” approach to deal with the initial conditions problem,
we will have to allow the parameters θπ,  to vary in a ﬂexible way with the individual’s initial
age. In this context, the number of θπ parameters to estimate may be very large and therefore
the estimation of all the parameters can be quite ineﬃcient. Keane and Wolpin (2001) propose
and implement a simulation estimation method which deals with this problem, and more generally
with the problem of missing state or choice data, which is in the same spirit as the ”structural
approach” that we have described above. They simulate complete outcome histories and match
them to incomplete observed histories in order to compute the probabilities of the latter, allowing
for measurement error in order to avoid degeneracy. They use it to estimate a dynamic model of
schooling choices with savings decisions and borrowing constraints. More recently, an alternative
approach to the initial conditions problem has been explored by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007)
(see section 4.2).
3.2.2 Nested Backwards Induction with Simulation and Interpolation
Keane and Wolpin’s simulation and interpolation method has been the most widely used for ap-
plications with large state spaces and unobservables which are correlated across choices, beginning
with the occupational choice model. The estimation criterion is FIML and individual contributions
to the likelihood are the ﬁnite mixtures shown in (16). Conditional on an individual’s unobserved
type Assumption CI-X holds so the likelihood factors into conditional choice probabilities and the
solution of the DP problem is characterized by the Emax function. However, the choice-speciﬁc
unobservables do not have extreme value distributions and are correlated so the CCP’s and Emax
functions do not have closed forms. Computing them involves solving J-dimensional integrals at
every point x in the state space. Keane and Wolpin use Monte Carlo integration to simulate these
multiple integrals. Furthermore, for every time period the Emax integrals are simulated at a subset
of the state space points only, and their value at every other point is interpolated using a regression
function which is ﬁt to the points in the subset.
As before, solving the model essentially amounts to obtaining the Emax function. In a ﬁnite
horizon model, this is done by backwards induction. Let ¯ V t(xt) be the integrated value function,
41or Emax function, at period t and for type  ,a sd e ﬁned in section 2.1. Let {ε
(r)
t : r =1 ,2,...,R}
be R random draws of histories of an individual’s unobservables. Using these random draws we
can construct simulation-based approximations (simulators) for the Emax function. Starting at the














At period t<Twe already know the simulator of next period’s Emax function, ˜ V ,t+1(.). Then,














˜ V ,t+1(x0) fx(x0|a,x)
)
(48)
Note that these Emax values should be calculated at every point x in the support X.T h i sc a nb e
very costly for DP problems with large state spaces. In order to alleviate this computational bur-
den the method obtains simulated-based approximations to the Emax function only at a (randomly
chosen) subset ¯ Xt of the state points every period. The Emax at other points are obtained as the pre-
dicted values from a regression function which is estimated from the points in ¯ Xt. In the model of ca-









˜ V ,t+1(x0) fx(x0|a,x) (49)
That is, the interpolating function depends on the state through choice-speciﬁc value functions
only. This interpolating function worked very well in this example but the arguments are costly to
compute and the full state space has to be spanned in either simulation or interpolation. Using a
polynomial in the state variables is much cheaper because in order to approximate the Emax at
state x, we don’t need to compute {vt(a,x)} and because of this we don’t need to know Emaxes at
all states that may visited in the future from x. Monte Carlo experiments reported in Keane and
Wolpin (1994) show that the method performed a bit less well in this case. However, polynomial
approximations have been used in most subsequent applications.
Given the Emax functions, the conditional choice probabilities and the conditional density of
the payoﬀ variables can be obtained using simulation.50 The parameters are estimated by FIML.
49We describe a version of Keane-Wolpin method that uses a simple frequency simulator. However, more eﬃcient
simulators can be used.
50Simulation of CCP’s is needed only at sample points; kernel smoothing is used in this case, in order to avoid
empty cells and to enable the use of gradient methods in the maximization of the likelihood. Note that the same
draws of ε
0s are used for the simulation of CCPs and the conditional density of wages. See Hajivassiliou and Rudd
(1994) for details on simulation of diﬀerent types of limited dependent variables models.
42As Keane and Wolpin noted, the approximation errors in the Emax functions enters non-linearly
in the CCP’s. Therefore, simulated CCP’s are biased and this implies that estimators of structural
parameters are not consistent.51 To put this problem into perspective, note that approximation
error in the Emax is not the only source of inconsistency; e.g., discretization of continuous variables,
approximate convergence of the Bellman operator in inﬁnite horizon problems, etc. Furthermore,
the large computational gain involved has allowed researchers using this method to produce many
interesting applications, estimating models with very large state spaces and richer structures than
would otherwise be possible.
3.3 Other issues in the estimation of single-agent models
3.3.1 Serially correlated, time-variant unobservables
We start this section reviewing methods and applications for models where the unobservables
follow stochastic process with serial correlation. The seminal paper by Pakes (1986) on patent
renewal was the ﬁr s ta p p l i c a t i o nt oe s t i m a t et h i st y p eo fm o d e l .T h e r ea r et w om a i ni s s u e si nt h e
estimation of this class of models. First, the observable state variable xt is not a suﬃcient statistic
for the current choice and the probability of an individual’s choice history cannot be factored into
CCP’s conditional on xt alone. Therefore, computing that individual contribution involves solving
an integral of dimension Ti. Pakes’ paper was one the ﬁrst econometric applications that used
Monte Carlo simulation techniques to approximate high dimensional integrals.52 Since Pakes’s
paper, there have been very important contributions in the areas of Monte Carlo integration (see
Geweke, 1996) and simulation-based estimation methods (see Stern, 1997). In the context of
dynamic discrete choice models, an important contribution was the development of the Geweke-
Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulator. This is a very eﬃcient importance-sampling simulator of
multinomial probabilities in discrete choice models with normally distributed unobservables. The
use of this simulator reduces signiﬁcantly the approximation error and thus the bias and variance
of simulation-based estimators.
A second important issue is that a DP problem with continuous state variables - observable
or unobservable - cannot be solved exactly and needs to be approximated using interpolation
methods or polynomial approximations.53 To illustrate this issue consider the occupational choice
51A bias remains as long as interpolation is used, even if the number of simulation draws goes to inﬁnity.
52See also the seminal work by Lerman and Manski (1981).
53This second issue is not a problem in Pakes’ patent renewal model. A nice feature of that application is that the
particular structure of the model (i.e., optimal stopping problem and the speciﬁcation of the stochastic process of εt)
is such that it is possible to obtain an exact recursive solution of the threshold values that characterize the optimal
decision rule.
43model in example 2 where, for every choice alternative, we omit the random eﬀect ωi(a) but re-
lax the IID assumption in εit(a). For instance, suppose that εit(a) follows an AR(1) process,
εit(a)=ρaεi,t−1(a)+ξit(a). The value function of this DP problem depends on εit, which is a vec-
tor of continuous variables, and cannot be solved exactly. Note that the problem cannot be solved
by considering the integrated value function, as in models where εit is iid, because it is no longer the
case that ¯ V (xit) ≡
R
V (xit,ε it)dGε(εit) fully characterizes the solution of the DP problem.54 There
are two classes of approximation methods to solve this type of DP problems: interpolation meth-
ods, and polynomial approximations. Stinebrickner (2000) discusses these methods in the context
of a dynamic discrete structural models with serial correlation and he presents some examples to
illustrate the relative strengths of the various approximation approaches. His experiments suggest
that, at least for models with normally distributed variables, interpolating methods based on Her-
mite and Gauss-Legendre quadrature perform very well even when the degree of serial correlation
is high. Bound, Stinebrickner and Waidman (2005) have recently applied Gauss-Legendre quadra-
ture interpolation to solve and estimate a structural model of retirement where a component of an
individual’s health is unobserved to the researcher and it is a continuous and serially correlated
random variable. The study in Benitez-Silva et al (2005) presents a very extensive comparison of
diﬀerent strategies for solving dynamic programming problems with continuous, serially correlated
state variables. One of the methods considered in that paper is the parameterized policy itera-
tion method. This solution method has been used by Hall and Rust (2003) in the estimation of a
model of inventory investment and price speculation by a durable commodity intermediary. The
simulation-interpolation method in Keane and Wolpin (1994) could also be used for this class of
models.
A recent paper by Hendel and Nevo (2006) presents an interesting and useful approximation
method for the estimation of dynamic demand models with large state spaces.55 Hendel and Nevo
estimate a dynamic model for the demand of a diﬀerentiated storable good (laundry detergent) using
consumer scanner data. They use the estimated model to study long-run and short-run demand
responses to temporary price reductions (i.e., sales promotions).56 The state space in this model
includes prices and advertising expenditures for all brands in all sizes of the product: more than one
54Note that the integrated value function ¯ V (xit,ε i,t−1) ≡
U
V (xit,ρε it+ξit)dGξ(ξit) fully characterizes the solution
of the DP problem. However, ¯ V (xit,ε i,t−1) has the same dimension as V (xit,ε it).
55Hendel and Nevo’s approach has clear similarities with the use of Gittins’s indexes in the estimation of an
occupational choice model in Miller (1984).
56The empirical results are really striking: static demand estimates overestimate own-price elasticities by 30% and
underestimate cross-price elasticities by 500%. Therefore, the biases of ignoring consumer intertemporal substitution
are very large and they have important economic implications in the standard applications of demand systems such
as measure of market power, antri-trust and merger analysis or the evaluation of the eﬀects of a new good.
44hundred continuous state variables. Hendel and Nevo show that in their model the probability of
choosing a brand conditional on quantity does not depend on dynamic considerations, and therefore
many of the demand parameters can be estimated from a static brand-choice model without solving
the DP problem. Once these parameters are estimated, it is possible to construct a single index
(or inclusive value) for each quantity choice (four quantity choice alternatives). These four indexes
summarize all the relevant information in prices and advertising expenditures for the current utility
of an individual. Then, Hendel and Nevo assume that these inclusive values follow a ﬁrst order
Markov process: i.e., all the information in current prices and advertising that is relevant to predict
next period inclusive values can be summarized in today’s inclusive values. Under this assumption,
more than hundred state variables can be summarized in just four state variables. This is a very
convenient approach in the estimation of dynamic demand models of diﬀerentiated products.57
Even under these assumptions the solution of the DP problem in this model is cumbersome: the
vector of state variables consists of the inclusive value, consumer inventory, and an unobserved
s h o c ki nt h em a r g i n a lu t i l i t yo fc o n s u m p t i o n ,w h i ch are all continuous variables. Thus, Hendel and
Nevo should use interpolation techniques to approximate the solution of the DP problem. They
use the parameterized policy iteration method in Benitez-Silva et al (2005) as the ’inner algorithm’
in a Rust’s nested ﬁxed point algorithm.
3.3.2 Approximation error and inference
Numerical methods provide only approximations to the solution of dynamic decision models with
continuous state variables. Therefore, the researcher cannot calculate the exact likelihood function
(or other sample criterion function) of the model but only an approximated likelihood based on
his approximated solution to the model. An important question is what are the implications for
statistical inference of using an approximated likelihood function. The literature on simulation-
based estimation has dealt with the implications of simulation errors on the asymptotic properties
of estimators. However, much less is known when the approximation error does not come from using
Monte Carlo simulators but from other numerical methods such as interpolation techniques. The
standard practice in applications that use interpolation techniques has been to conduct inference as
if the exact solution of the model were used and to ignore the eﬀects of approximation errors. In this
context, the recent paper by Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez and Santos (2006) contains some
57Nevertheless, under realistic speciﬁcations for the stochastic process of prices and brand-choice parameters, the
assumption of a Markov process for inclusive value can be clearly rejected. On the positive side, this is an assumption
t h a tc a nb et e s t e de m p i r i c a l l ya n dt h a tc a nb er e l a x e dt oacertain extent, e.g., a higher order Markov process. See
Erdem, Imai and Keane (2003) for a similar application with diﬀerent assumptions and estimation method.
45important contributions to this diﬃcult topic. They show that convergence of the approximated
policy function to the exact policy function does not necessarily implies that the approximated
likelihood function also converges to the exact likelihood. Some additional conditions are needed
for convergence of the likelihood function. In particular, in addition to regularity conditions to
have a well deﬁned likelihood function, the optimal decision rule and the transition rule of the state
variables, as functions of the vector of structural parameters, should be continuously diﬀerentiable
and have bounded partial derivatives. They also propose a likelihood ratio test to check for the
importance of errors in the approximated likelihood. Suppose that a researcher is using interpolation
methods to approximate the solution of a DP model and that he solves and estimates the model
under two diﬀerent levels of approximation error, e.g., two diﬀerent grids of points in the state
space. We can interpret the two diﬀerent approximations as two competing models. We want to
test if the data signiﬁcantly support one approximation over the other one. Let ˆ l(1) and ˆ l(2) be the
maximum values of the two likelihood functions under the two levels of approximation error. The
likelihood ratio statistic is LR = ˆ l(1) −ˆ l(2). Vuong (1989) develops the asymptotic behavior of this
statistic for both nested and non-nested models and his results are general enough to include the
case we consider here. Based on this test, Fernandez-Villaverde et al. suggest to use an increasing
approach to choose the degree of accuracy in the numerical solution of the model. That is, to
increase the accuracy of the numerical solution until the likelihood ratio test cannot reject that the
less accurate solution is statistically equivalent to the more accurate solution.
3.3.3 Bayesian methods
The computational cost of evaluating the likelihood in structural dynamic discrete choice models
has sofar made Bayesian inference in these models intractable.58 If a Markov Chain Montecarlo
algorithm (MCMC) is used, the number of likelihood evaluations that is required is typically much
larger than in the case of algorithms tailored to classical likelihood-based inference. In a recent
paper, Imai , Jain and Ching (2007) propose an estimation method which promises to alleviate
this problem signiﬁcantly. At each iteration, a modiﬁed Metropolis-Hastings step is combined with
a single iteration in the Bellman equation which updates the value function and replaces the full
solution of the DP problem. Therefore, estimation and solution proceed simultaneously. This is
in the same spirit as Aguirregabiria and Mira’s NPL algorithm, but gradual updating of the DP
solution is carried out in ’value function space’ rather than in ’conditional choice probability space’.
58An exception is Lancaster (1997) who demonstrates the feasibility of Bayesian inference in a search model with
closed form solutions. Geweke and Keane (1995) show how to do Bayesian inference when the future component of
the value function is replaced by a ﬂexible approximation in order to avoid the burden of full solution.
46Imai et al show that the approximate solution converges to the full solution and the approximate
posterior converges to the true posterior. They illustrate their method in Montecarlo experiments
with uninformative priors for models of ﬁrm entry and exit with random eﬀects and continuous
state variables.
3.3.4 Validation of dynamic structural models
One of the most attractive features of dynamic structural models is that they can be used to predict
the eﬀects of counterfactual policy changes (or ex ante policy evaluation). Clearly, a prerequisite
for such an exercise is that the researcher has enough conﬁdence in the estimated structural model,
i.e., the model needs to be validated. Some of the most commonly used criteria for validation
of dynamic structural models have been: (a) conformity with the researcher’s priors on "admis-
sible" ranges of parameter values, based on economic theory and/or previous empirical work; (b)
informal assessment of goodness of ﬁt; (c) formal speciﬁcation tests such as goodness of ﬁta n d
over-identifying restrictions tests (see Andrews, 1988, and Rust, 1994). However, these criteria
may seem insuﬃcient for the purpose of credible policy evaluation. First, many researchers are
concerned about identiﬁcation. Second, goodness of ﬁt and over-identifying restrictions tests are of
limited usefulness when the estimated model is the result of pretesting (or "structural data mining",
as referred by Wolpin, 2007). Alternative speciﬁcations with very similar in-sample performance
may provide very diﬀerent out-of-sample predictions of the eﬀects of counterfactual policies. In
fact, as pointed out by Wolpin (2007), it can be the case that some model features that contribute
to improve in-sample goodness-of-ﬁtm a yh a v ean e g a t i v ee ﬀect on the performance of the model for
the prediction of counterfactual experiments. Then, how should we choose among these models?
First, if the structural model will be use to predict a counterfactual policy, it seems reasonable
that the model should be judged in terms of its ability to predict that particular policy. In this
sense, the "best" model depends on the type of counterfactual policy one wants to predict. Social
experiments and exogenous regime swifts provide very useful information for the credible validation
of a structural model. Subject to identiﬁcation issues, one can estimate the structural model using
the control-group subsample and then use the experimental group to evaluate how well the model
predicts the eﬀects of the policy intervention which was the object of the social experiment. Once
a model has been selected in this way, it can be used to predict extrapolations of the policy in the
social experiment. This idea has been used before in dynamic structural models by Lumsdaine,
Stock and Wise (1992), to predict retirement behavior under alternative pension plans, and by
Todd and Wolpin (2006), to predict the eﬀect of subsidies on children school attendance in Mexico.
47However, for good or for bad, social experiments and regime swifts are a rarity. In a recent
paper, Keane and Wolpin (2007) propose an approach for model validation that is in this same
spirit but can be used when non-experimental data is available. The approach consists in holding
out a part of the sample that has the characteristics of a policy change similar (in some way) to
the counterfactual policy that we want to evaluate. The hold out sample plays the same role as the
treatment group sample when a social experiment is available: it is not used for estimation but it is
used to validate the predictive ability of the model. For instance, a researcher who wants to predict
the eﬀect of a child care subsidy program on a female labor supply model may estimate model
using the subsample of females with two or more children and holdout the sample of females with
less than two children. This idea seems very interesting and useful, though the fact the subsample
selection is not random introduces nontrivial econometric issues.
3.3.5 Relaxing rational expectations using subjective expectations data
The assumption of rational expectations has been ubiquitous in this literature. Nevertheless, this
is a very strong assumption in many applications. Information is costly and individuals typically
make predictions using diﬀerent sets of partial information. Though the rational expectations as-
sumptions is made for identiﬁcation reasons (i.e., observed choices may be consistent with many
alternative speciﬁcations of preferences and expectations), it can induce serious biases in our pre-
dictions of counterfactual experiments. Data on expectations can be used to relax or to validate
assumptions about expectations, and it can make the predictions of dynamic structural models
more credible. Manski (2004) presents an excellent review on the use of data on subjective expec-
tations in microeconometric decision models. In the context of dynamic discrete choice structural
models, an example is the study by van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2005) on Social Security and
savings. The study uses data on subjective expectations from the Health and Retirement Sur-
vey (expectations over the own retirement age and longevity) and from the Survey of Economic
Expectations (expectations over future changes in Social Security policy).
4 Estimation methods for dynamic discrete games
As we did for single agent models, we distinguish between the structural parameters in the util-
ity function, θu, in the payoﬀ function, θY , and in the transition rules of the state variables,
θf. Under assumptions CI-X and CI-Y, for the estimation of θY and θf we do not have to
deal with the problem of calculating a MPE of the game. We can estimate θY and θf as the








t=1 logfx(xm,t+1|amt,xmt;θf), respectively. We assume that β is known and that θY and
θf have been estimated in a ﬁrst step and we focus on the estimation of the parameters in θu, which
requires that we exploit the equilibrium structure of the game. Following most of the papers in
this literature, we start considering that the observations in the data have been generated by only
one Markov Perfect equilibrium.
ASSUMPTION One-MPE-Data: Deﬁne the distribution of amt conditional on xmt in market m
at period t as P0
mt ≡ {Pr(amt = a|xmt = x):( a,x) ∈ AN × X}. (A) For every observation
(m,t), P0
mt = P0. (B) Players expect P0 to be played in future (out of sample) periods. (C) The
observations {amt,x mt} are independent across markets and Pr(xmt = x) > 0 for all x in X.
Assumption (A) establishes that the data has been generated by only one Markov Perfect
equilibrium. Thus even if the model has multiple equilibria, the researcher does not need to
specify an equilibrium selection mechanism because the equilibrium that has been selected will be
identiﬁed from the conditional choice probabilities in the data. We will discuss in section 4.2 how
this assumption can be relaxed. Assumption (B) is necessary in order to accommodate dynamic
models. Without it, we cannot compute the expected future payoﬀs of within-sample actions unless
we specify the beliefs of players regarding the probability of switching equilibria in the future.
Following the notation in section 2.3, let Λ(vP(θ)) ≡ {Λ(ai|vP
i (.,x,θ)) : (i,ai,x) ∈ I×A×X} be
the equilibrium mapping of the dynamic game. Furthermore, let vP
i (ai,x,θ) hereafter denote Hotz-
Miller’s representation of choice-speciﬁc value functions, adapted to this context (see details below).
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) show that, for given θ, a vector of conditional choice probabilities
P is a MPE of the game if and only if satisﬁes the ﬁxed point condition, P = Λ(vP(θ)).F o rt h e










where P is an arbitrary vector of players’ choice probabilities. This is a ”pseudo” likelihood because
the choice probabilities Λ(aimt|vP
i (xmt,θ)) are not necessarily equilibrium probabilities associated
with θ, but just best responses to arbitrary beliefs P about other players’ behavior. The MLE can
be deﬁned as:





Q(θ,P) subject to : P = Λ(vP(θ))
)
(51)
49For given θ, the expression P = Λ(vP(θ)) deﬁnes the set of vectors P which are equilibria associated
with that value of the structural parameters. For some values of θ that set may contain more than
one P and therefore to obtain the MLE one should maximize over the set of equilibria. Under
standard regularity conditions, multiple equilibria does not aﬀect the standard properties of the
MLE which in this model is root-M consistent, asymptotically normal and eﬃcient. However, in
practice, this estimator can be very diﬃcult to implement. This is particularly the case if we use
an algorithm that for each trial value of θ computes all the vectors P which are an equilibrium
associated with θ and then selects the one with maximum value for Q(θ,P). Finding all the Markov
Perfect equilibria of a dynamic game can be very diﬃcult even for relatively simple models.
4.1 Two-Step methods
Several recent papers (Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007), Jofre-
Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003), Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2007), and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-
Dengler (2007)) have proposed diﬀerent versions and extensions of Hotz-Miller CCP estimator to
the estimation of dynamic games. An interesting aspect of the application of the CCP estimator
to dynamic games is that this method deals with the problem of multiple equilibria, i.e., it avoids
the optimization of the (pseudo) likelihood with respect to P. Under assumption ‘One-MPE-
Data’, players’ choice probabilities can be interpreted as players’ beliefs about the behavior of
their opponents. Given these beliefs, one can interpret each player’s problem as a game against
nature with a unique optimal decision rule in probability space, which is the player’s best response.
While equilibrium probabilities are not unique functions of structural parameters, the best response
mapping is a unique function of structural parameters and players’ beliefs about the behavior of
other players. These methods use best response functions evaluated at consistent nonparametric
estimates of players’ beliefs.
We now describe diﬀerent variants of this estimator in the context of dynamic games. As in
the case of single agent models, the CCP method is particularly useful in models where the utility
function is linear in parameters. Therefore, we assume that ui(at,x t,θu)=zi(at,x t)0θu,w h e r e
zi(at,x t) is a vector of known functions. Let P be a vector of conditional choice probabilities,
for every player, state and action. Following the same approach as in single agent models, the
alternative-speciﬁc value functions can be written as follows:
vP
i (ai,x t)=˜ zP
i (ai,x t) θu +˜ eP
i (ai,x t) (52)
where ˜ zP
i (ai,x t) is the expected and discounted sum of current and future z0
is that originate from
50(ai,x t) given that all players behave now and in the future according to the probabilities in P;a n d
˜ eP
i (ai,x t) is the expected and discounted sum of the stream {εi,t+j(ai,t+j):j =1 ,2,...} given that
the sequence of players’ actions is generated by the choice probabilities in P. More formally, we
have that:
˜ zP
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# (53)




i be the matrix {(WP
zi(x),WP
ei(x)) : x ∈ X}. Then, this valuation operator is





{[zi(a),ei(a)]+β Fx(a)W},a n dei(a) has the same deﬁnition as in the single agent model.
Let ˆ P, ˆ θY and ˆ θf be consistent estimators of P0, θ0
Y and θ0
f, respectively. Based on these initial
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where H(xmt) is a matrix with dimension dim(θu) × J with functions of xmt which are used as
instruments. The estimator is root-M consistent and asymptotically normal. This estimator is
used by Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) and Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2007). An attractive
feature of this method of moments estimator, emphasized by Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2007),
is that when the matrix of instruments Hi(xmt) does not depend on the nonparametric estimator
ˆ P, this estimator can have lower ﬁnite sample bias than the pseudo maximum likelihood and the
minimum distance estimators that we describe in the following paragraphs. We return to this issue
at the end of this section.
The two-step method in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) is a pseudo maximum likelihood (PML)
estimator that maximizes in θu the criterion function Q(θu,ˆ θY ,ˆ θf, ˆ P).T h ev a l u e s˜ z
ˆ P
i and ˜ e
ˆ P
i are
calculated as described above: i.e., solving for the matrices W
ˆ P
i and then applying the expressions in
(53). This method is a particular case of the class of GMM estimators deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 5 4 ) .T h e
(pseudo) likelihood equations that deﬁne this estimator can be expressed as in (54) with a matrix
Hi(xmt) equal to diag{∂ logΛimt(j)/∂θu : j =0 ,1,...,J}. This PML method is asymptotically
51eﬃcient within the class of GMM estimators described by conditions (54). However, in contrast to
the case of single-agent models, this estimator is less eﬃcient asymptotically than the partial MLE.
This is because the initial nonparametric estimator of P0 and the PML estimator of θ0
u are not
asymptotically independent and therefore there is an eﬃciency loss from using an ineﬃcient initial
estimator of P0.
Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2007) consider the following class of minimum distance esti-
mators:
ˆ θu =a r gm i n
θu
h













where AM is a weighting matrix that converges in probability to a non-stochastic positive deﬁnite
matrix A0 as M goes to inﬁnity. Diﬀerent choices of weighting matrices give rise to distinct
estimators within this class. Under standard regularity conditions, all the estimators in this class
are consistent and asymptotically normal. Minimum distance estimation theory establishes that
the eﬃcient estimator in this class is the one where the weighting matrix A0 is:
µ∙µ
I

















. . .0) is the identity matrix vertically stacked with a matrix of zeros; ∇P,θY ,θfΛ is the
Jacobian matrix of Λ with respect to P, θY and θf;a n dΣ is the variance matrix of the initial
estimators ˆ P, ˆ θY and ˆ θf. Note that this optimal weighting matrix depends on θ0
u. Therefore, the
eﬃcient estimator is obtained in three steps: estimate ˆ P, ˆ θY and ˆ θf0 and their variance; obtain an
ineﬃcient minimum distance estimator of θ0
u; ﬁnally, construct a consistent estimator of the optimal
weighting matrix and obtain the eﬃcient estimator. Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler show that
this eﬃcient estimator is asymptotically equivalent to MLE.
In models with continuous state variables or with large state spaces, the computation of con-
tinuation values ˜ z
ˆ P
i and ˜ e
ˆ P
i can be infeasible or extremely burdensome. Bajari, Benkard and Levin
(2007) propose a method that builds on and extends the simulation-based CCP estimator that we
have described in section 3.1.4. Their method has two important features that distinguish it from
the other methods that we review here: it can be applied to models with continuous decision vari-
ables (as long as the utility function satisﬁes ∂2u(ai,a −i,x,ε i)/∂ai∂εi ≥ 0), and to models where
the parameters are not point identiﬁed (i.e., set identiﬁcation). In fact, these two features of their
method also contribute to the literature on estimation of single-agent dynamic structural models.
Bajari, Benkard and Levin (BBL) propose an estimator that minimizes a set of moment inequal-
ities and that can be applied to a general class of dynamic structural models under assumptions
52AS, IID and CI-X, including dynamic games with either discrete or continuous decision and state
variables. Deﬁne WP
i (x) ≡ (WP
zi(x),WP
ei(x)), and split the vector of choice probabilities P into the
sub-vectors Pi and P−i,w h e r ePi are the probabilities associated to player i and P−i contains the
probabilities of the other players. The model implies that for any state x ∈ X and any Pi 6= P0
i



















Let H be a set of values for (i,x,P).I f t h e s e t H is large enough and θ0
u is identiﬁed, then θ0
u




















This criterion function penalizes departures from the inequalities in (57). The Bajari-Benkard-
Levin (BBL) estimator of θ0
u minimizes a simulation-based sample counterpart of this criterion
function. More precisely,

















where ˆ P is a nonparametric estimator of P0 (there is also initial estimator of θ0
Y and θ0
f but we have
omitted them for the sake of notational simplicity), and ˜ Wi is a simulator of Wi which is obtained
as described in section 3.1.4. The estimator is root-M consistent and asymptotically normal. The
asymptotic variance of the estimator depends not only on the variance of ˆ P but also on the number
of simulations and, very importantly, on the choice of the set of "deviations" with respect to the
optimal policy contained in H. Bajari et al. describe a bootstrap procedure to calculate standard
errors (see also Chernozhukov, Hong and Tamer, 2007). Ryan (2006) uses this method to estimate
a dynamic oligopoly model of the US cement industry. In his model, ﬁrms compete in quantities in
a static equilibrium, but they are subject to capacity constraints. Firms invest in future capacity
and this decision is partly irreversible (and therefore dynamic). Note that the decision variable
in this model, investment, is a censored continuous variable. Ryan estimates the parameters in
demand and marginal costs using data on prices, quantities and the static equilibrium conditions.
In a second step he estimates investment costs as well as entry and exit costs using BBL’s inequality
estimator. Ryan allows entry costs to vary before and after year 1990 when several amendments
were introduced in the Clean Air Act. He ﬁnds that these amendments raised signiﬁcantly the sunk
costs of entry in the cement industry.
53The main advantage of these two-step estimators is their computational simplicity. However,
they have two important limitations. The ﬁrst problem is ﬁnite sample bias. The initial nonpara-
metric estimator can be very imprecise in the small samples available in actual applications, and
this can generate serious ﬁnite sample biases in the two-step estimator of structural parameters. In
dynamic games with heterogeneous players the number of observable state variables is proportional
to the number of players and therefore the so called curse of dimensionality in nonparametric esti-
mation (and the associated bias of the two-step estimator) can be particularly serious. The sources
of this ﬁnite sample bias can be illustrated using the moment conditions in (54): (1) if the matrix
of instruments Hi(xmt) depends on the nonparametric estimator ˆ P0, then there is a ﬁnite sample
correlation between these instruments and the "errors" I{aimt = j} − Λ(j| ˜ zimtθu +˜ eimt);a n d( 2 )
the choice probabilities Λ(j| ˜ zimtθu+˜ eimt) are complicated nonlinear functions of the nonparametric
estimator ˆ P0, and the expected value of a nonlinear function is not equal to the function evaluated
at the expected value. As argued by Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2007), the ﬁrst source of bias is
present in the pseudo maximum likelihood estimator and the minimum distance estimator but not
in a simple method of moments estimator. However, the second source of bias appears in all these
two steps estimators and it can be very important as illustrated in the Monte Carlo experiments
of several papers (see the Monte Carlo experiments in Hotz et al., 1994, Aguirregabiria and Mira,
2002 and 2007, or Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler, 2007).
A second important limitation of these two-step methods is the restrictions imposed by the IID
assumption. Ignoring persistent unobservables, if present, can generate important biases in the
estimation of structural parameters.
4.2 Sequential estimation
We have described in section 3.1.3 how a recursive or sequential CCP procedure is a bias reduction
method that deals with the problem of ﬁnite sample bias of the two-step CCP estimator. This
procedure can be particularly useful in the context of dynamic games with heterogeneous players
because it is in this context where the ﬁnite sample bias of the two-step estimator can be very
serious. The sequential CCP method or NPL algorithm also deals with the issue of permanent
unobserved heterogeneity. Here we follow Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and describe the NPL
method for a model with permanent unobserved market heterogeneity. Consider the entry-exit
model in Example 4 but extended to include unobserved market heterogeneity. The proﬁto fa n
54active ﬁrm is:






− θFC,i− θEC,i(1 − aim,t−1)+ωm + εimt (60)
where ωm is a random eﬀect interpreted as a time-invariant market characteristic aﬀecting ﬁrms’
proﬁts, which is common knowledge to the players but unobservable to the econometrician. We
assume that ωm has a discrete and ﬁnite support Ω =
©
ω1,ω2,...,ωLª
, and it is indepen-
dently and identically distributed across markets with probability mass function π  ≡ Pr(ωm =
ω ). Furthermore, ωm does not enter into the conditional transition probability of xmt,i . e . ,
Pr(xm,t+1|amt,x mt,ωm)=fx(xm,t+1|amt,x mt). This assumption implies that the transition proba-
bility function fx can still be estimated from transition data without solving the model.
The introduction of unobserved market heterogeneity also implies that we can relax the assump-
tion of only ‘One MPE in the data’ to allow for diﬀerent market types to have diﬀerent equilibria.
Let P0
mt ≡ {Pr(amt = a|xmt = x,m,t):( a,x) ∈ AN × X} be the distributions of amt conditional
on xmt in market m at period t. We assume that P0
mt = P0
 ,w h e r e  is the type of market m.
Each market type has its own MPE. Though we still assume that only one equilibrium is played
in the data conditional on market type, the data generating process may correspond to multiple
equilibria. Markets which are observationally equivalent to the econometrician may have diﬀerent
probabilities of entry and exit because the random eﬀect component of proﬁts ω is diﬀerent. Fur-
thermore, though, in our example, market heterogeneity ωm is payoﬀ-relevant, this variable may
also play (in part) the role of a sunspot.
The vector of structural parameters now includes the distribution of ﬁrm types: π ≡ {π  :
  =1 ,2,...,L} and Ω =
©
ω1,ω2,...,ωLª
. The (conditional) pseudo likelihood function has the
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where π |x is the conditional probability Pr(ωm = ω |xm1 = x). It is clear that ﬁrms’ incumbent
statuses at period 1, which are components of the vector xm1, are not independent of market type,
i.e., more proﬁtable markets tend to have more incumbent ﬁrms. Therefore, π |xm1 is not equal
to the unconditional probability π . Under the assumption that xm1 is drawn from the stationary
distribution induced by the MPE, we can obtain the form of π |xm1.L e tp∗(P ) ≡ {p∗(x|P ):x ∈
X} be the stationary distribution of x induced by the equilibrium P  and the transition fx(.|.,θf).




















Then, by Bayes’ rule, we have that:
π |xm1 =
π  p∗(xm1|P )
L P
 0=1
π 0 p∗(xm1|P 0)
(63)
The NPL estimator is obtained using an iterative procedure similar to the one we have described
in section 3.1.3 for a model without heterogeneity. The main diﬀerence is that now we have to
calculate the steady-state distributions p∗(P ) to deal with the initial conditions problem. However,
the pseudo likelihood approach also reduces very signiﬁcantly the cost of dealing with the initial
conditions problem. The reason is that given P  the steady-state distributions do not depend on the
structural parameters in θu. Therefore, the distributions p∗(P ) remain constant during any pseudo
maximum likelihood estimation and they are updated only between two pseudo maximum likelihood
estimations when new choice probabilities are obtained. This implies a very signiﬁcant reduction
in the computational cost associated with the initial conditions problem. Aguirregabiria and Mira
(2007) also consider a distribution of ωm that simpliﬁes the computation of the NPL: ωm = σωω∗
m
where ω∗
m is a discretized standard normal. Therefore, the support of ω∗
m and the probabilities
π  are known and the only parameter to be estimated is σω. Given this distribution of ωm,t h e
probabilities π |xm1 also remain constant during any pseudo maximum likelihood estimation. The
algorithm proceeds as follows. We start with L arbitrary vectors of players’ choice probabilities, one
for each market type: {ˆ P 0 :   =1 ,2,...,L}. Then, we perform the following steps. Step 1: For every
market type we obtain the steady-state distribution of xm1 and the probabilities {π |xm1}.S t e p2 :
We obtain the pseudo maximum likelihood estimator of θu and σω as: (ˆ θu1, ˆ σω1) = argmax(θu,σω)
Q(θu,σω,ˆ θY ,ˆ θf,{ˆ P 0}). Step 3: Update the vector of players’ choice probabilities using the best
response probability mapping. That is, for market type  , ˆ P 1 = Λ(v
ˆ P 0(ˆ θu1, ˆ σω1,ω∗
 ,ˆ θY ,ˆ θf)).I f ,
for every type  , ||ˆ P 1−ˆ P 0|| is smaller than a predetermined small constant, then stop the iterative
procedure and choose (ˆ θu1, ˆ σω1) as the NPL estimator. Otherwise, repeat steps 1 to 4 using {ˆ P 1}.
Collard-Wexler (2006) uses this method to estimate a dynamic oligopoly model of entry and exit
in the US ready-mix concrete industry. He ﬁnds that including unobserved market heterogeneity
increases very signiﬁc a n t l yt h ee s t i m a t eo ft h ee ﬀect of competitors on proﬁts (i.e., the parameter
56θRN in equation (60)). While the eﬀect of a second competitor on proﬁts is positive in the model
without market eﬀects, it is negative and signiﬁcant when market heterogeneity is included.
5 General equilibrium models
In this section we describe the method proposed by Lee and Wolpin (LW) to estimate competitive
equilibrium models. The model is that of Example 3, which is a simpliﬁed version of the model
in LW with only one sector and two occupations as in Lee (2005). Total factor productivity zt is
assumed to follow an AR(1) process. This is the only source of exogenous aggregate uncertainty
which is explicitly modelled and it implies that individuals solving the occupational choice model
face uncertainty about future skill prices. Future skill prices depend on future TFP and on future
cross-sectional distributions of schooling and occupation-speciﬁc experience. However, including
these distributions in the vector of state variables e Xt would make the dimension of the state space
so large as to make solution and estimation infeasible. Lee and Wolpin assume that current and
lagged values of skill prices provide a good approximation to the information contained in these
distributions that is relevant to predict future skill prices. More speciﬁcally, LW assume that the
evolution of skill prices is described by the following system of diﬀerence equations:
lnra,t+1 − lnra,t = ηa0 +
2 X
k=1
ηak(lnrk,t − lnrk,t−1)+ηa3(lnzt+1 − lnzt) (64)
where η ≡ {ηa0,ηa1,ηa2,ηa3 : a =1 ,2} is a vector of parameters. Under this assumption the vector
of aggregate state variables that individuals use to predict future prices is e Xt =( zt,r 1t,r 2t,r 1,t−1,r 2,t−1).
Therefore, the equilibria they consider are approximations to the full rational expectations equilib-
ria. This approach is in the spirit of Krusell and Smith (1998). It is important to note that the
vector η is determined in equilibrium as a function of the structural parameters, but is not itself
one of the structural parameters or primitives of the model.
The vector of structural parameters of the model is θ =( θu,θy,θπ,θY ,θz,θn) where: θu and θy
represents the parameters in utility function and wage equations, respectively; θπ is the distribution
of types (by cohort, schooling at age 16 and gender); θY contains the parameters in the aggregate
production function; θz has the coeﬃcients in the stochastic process of total factor productivity;
and θn represents the parameters in the stochastic process followed by the number of pre-school
children.
A rational expectations equilibrium in this model can be described as a value of the vector η,
say η∗(θ),t h a ts o l v e saﬁxed point problem. The following description of the equilibrium mapping
57also provides an algorithm to compute the ﬁxed point. Consider an arbitrary value of η,s a yη0.
Step 1 (Optimal individual behavior): Given η0 individuals use equation (64) to form
expectations about future prices, and to solve their occupational choice problems.
Step 2 (Solve for market clearing skill prices): Given initial conditions for TFP, skill
prices and the distribution of state variables for all individuals alive at t =1:
a. Simulate a sequence of values of TFP for t =1 ,2,...,T , drawing from the AR(1)
process deﬁned by θz.
b. Guess skill prices {rat} at t =1using the TFP draw and equation (64) Draw
idiosyncratic shocks for all individuals alive at t =1and simulate their choices using
the solutions from step 1. Obtain aggregate skill supplies S1t and S1t for t =1 .
c. Given these skill supplies, use the market clearing conditions to obtain a new












for a =1 ,2 for t =1
d. In general, the new skill prices {r0
at} will not be the same as the original guess
{rat}. Replace {rat} by {r0
at} and repeat steps b-c until convergence.
e. Repeat steps b-c-d for t =2 ,..,T.Let {rat(η0,θ):t =1 ,2,...,T} be the sequence
of skill prices that we obtain upon convergence.
S t e p3( U p d a t eB e l i e f s ) :Use this new sequence of skill prices and the sequence of TFP
to obtain a new value of η,s a yη1, as the vector of OLS coeﬃcients for the ’regression
equation’ in (64).
Step 4 (Impose Self-Fulﬁlling Beliefs): If η1 = η0,t h e nη0 is a rational expectations
equilibrium associated with θ, i.e., individuals’ beliefs are self-fulﬁlling. Otherwise, we
start again in Step 1 using η1 instead of η0.
The data used in LW have annual frequency and consist of the following items from diﬀerent
sources: (1) occupational choice and wage data (from micro surveys); (2) aggregate output and
capital stock; (3) number of pre-school children, by cohort age and gender; (4) cohort sizes, by
gender; (5) distribution of schooling at age 16, by cohort and gender; and (6) the initial conditions,
i.e., the distribution of state variables xi1 for all cohorts alive at calendar time t =1 .T o m a k e
the inference problem more tractable, LW treat data in items (2) to (6) as population parameters
which are known to the researcher. The parameter θn is obtained directly from (3) and is not
estimated with the rest of the parameters. Note that data in items (2), (4), (5) and (6) is used in
58the solution algorithm we have just described. For the occupational choice and wage data in item
(1), the authors combine two diﬀerent micro surveys: the Current Population Survey (CPS) and
the National Longitudinal Survey of the Youth (NLSY). The two datasets are complementary: on
the one hand, the CPS covers a much longer period and thus provides a much wider coverage in
terms of calendar time, cohorts and ages; on the other hand, the NLSY has full histories as of age
16, so it adds a true panel dimension and, furthermore, experience capital can be constructed for
all sampled individuals.
The estimation method that LW use is a Simulated Method of Moments (SMM). The estimation
criterion is a weighted average distance between sample and simulated moments, where the weights
are the inverses of the estimated variances of the moments. Moments are selected from CPS and
NLSY micro data and a very large number of moments is considered (see pages 23-24 in their
paper). The estimation procedure is a nested solution-estimation algorithm. The ’outer algorithm’
searches for the value of θ that minimizes the sample criterion function. An iteration of this ’outer
algorithm’ is a Newton iteration. For each value of θ in this gradient search, the ’inside algorithm’
solves for an equilibrium of the model using the procedure that we have described in steps 1 to 4
above. Given that equilibrium, the inside algorithm simulates data and calculates the simulated
moments associated with a given θ.59
It is helpful to compare this estimation procedure with the one for the single-agent occupa-
tional choice model in Example 2. In the single-agent model there was not aggregate uncertainty,
structural parameters consisted of (θu,θπ,θn) and of constant skill prices ¯ r1 and ¯ r2, and these pa-
rameters were estimated using the likelihood of the micro data in item (1). In LW’s approximation
to a stochastic rational expectations equilibrium, the state vector of an individual agent’s prob-
lem is augmented with the 5 continuous aggregate variables e Xt =( zt,r 1t,r 2t,r 1,t−1,r 2,t−1) and the
parameter vector is augmented with parameters (θz,η). However, η is not a free parameter but a
function of the structural parameters θ implicitly deﬁned as a ﬁxed point of the equilibrium map-
ping described above. Therefore, the estimation problem is an order of magnitude more complex
than in Example 2.
There are several details of LW’s method which are worth mentioning. First, note that at step
2 of the solution algorithm (i.e., imposing market clearing condition) we need initial conditions for
TFP and skill prices, {ra1,z 1 : a =1 ,2}, which are unobservable variables for the researcher. The
59Lee and Wolpin do not estimate all the model parameters using this nested procedure. The parameters in the
stochastic process of the number of pre-school children, θn, are estimated separately in a ﬁrst step using data item
(3).
59way that LW deal with this issue is by choosing an initial period t =1which is many periods before
the sample period that is used to construct moments conditions from the micro data. In this way,
the choice of the initial conditions has negligible inﬂuence on the simulated data for the sample
period. This amounts to assuming that aggregate initial conditions are consistent with ’steady
state’ implications of the model, modiﬁed by the limited information we have about aggregate
trends in the decades that precede the sample period.
A second detail deals with the solution of the individuals’ occupational choice problem. The
state space of the DP problem is very large and the estimation procedure requires that the DP
problem be solved many times, more than once for each cohort, type and candidate parameter
value. LW use Keane-Wolpin’s simulation-interpolation method to approximate the solution to
individuals’ occupational choice problem.
Third, a relevant question is why SMM is used instead of Simulated Maximum Likelihood. The
likelihood function of this model is particularly complex and costly to evaluate. For instance, full
histories of choices and states are not available for all sampled individuals and, in particular, the
value of occupation-speciﬁc experience capital is not observable. Missing state variables have to be
integrated out for each individual contribution to the likelihood. Computing the likelihood using
simulation methods is therefore more costly than computing simulated moments.
Fourth, in order to highlight the equilibrium mapping and the solution of the model we have
presented a simpliﬁed version of LW’s solution/estimation algorithm in which no use is made of
the time series of output in data item (2). In LW’s solution algorithm the sequence of TFP values
in step 2 is not simulated. Instead, they impose that the value of zt which is conjectured to derive
aggregate skill supplies in step 2b should be consistent with aggregate production technology, that






t where S1t and S2t are the derived supplies and Yt and Kt are the
actual time series data. The iterative procedure within step 2 obtains both the market clearing skill
rental prices and the TFP values consistent with the data. In step 3 both η and θz are updated
b a s e do nt h es e q u e n c e sd e r i v e di ns t e p2 .I nt h i ss o l u t i o na l g o r i t h mθz is not a free parameter. An
’estimate’ of it is obtained as a by-product, conditional on the rest of the parameter vector and
data item (2).
Finally, given that LW’s method is computationally very intensive, an important question is
whether there is a simpler estimation strategy which does not require one to solve for the equilib-
rium of the model for each trial value of θ. Consider the same model and assume that the data
has been generated by a rational expectations equilibrium of this model. It is possible to obtain
60an estimator of an augmented parameter vector (θ,η) that does not fully impose the equilibrium
restrictions. The main advantage of this alternative approach, in the spirit of Heckman et al, is
that it is computationally simpler: its computational burden is of the same order of magnitude
as the one in the estimation of the single-agent occupational choice model. However, it has some
potential limitations. First, it may be diﬃcult to identify (θ,η) jointly without fully imposing the
equilibrium restrictions. Relatedly, there is a loss of eﬃciency. Even if (θ,η) is identiﬁed, impos-
ing the equilibrium restrictions can improve signiﬁcantly the precision of our estimates. A third
limitation is that the estimated model, though statistically consistent, is not internally consistent
and one might argue that this detracts from the credibility of counterfactual exercises.60 There is a
trade-oﬀ between the increased eﬃciency and internal consistency of the estimates obtained using
Lee and Wolpin’s method and the extra computational burden which is involved.61
60That is, the estimate vector η can be very diﬀerent to the value that we get using information from skill prices
generated from the market clearing conditions. A possible way of dealing with this internal inconsistency is to include
this discrepancy as one of the moment conditions in the sample criterion function to minimize.
61A solution algorithm like Lee and Wolpin’s is still needed to carry out their empirical analysis of the growth of
the service sector which is based on counterfactuals.
61Appendix: A guide to the use of the programming codes in the companion web page
1. Rust’s nested ﬁxed point algorithm (NFXP).
2. Hotz-Miller’s CCP.
3. Hotz-Miller’s CCP with simulation
4. Nested pseudo maximum likelihood (NPL).
5. Keane-Wolpin simulation-interpolation method.
6. Bajari-Benkard-Levin method (BBL).
7. Arcidiacono-Jones EM algorithm
8. Benitez-Silva, Hall, Hitsch, and Rust’s NFXP with Parameterized Policy Iterations.
62References
[1] Aguirregabiria, V. (1999): “The Dynamics of Markups and Inventories in Retailing Firms,”
T h eR e v i e wo fE c o n o m i cS t u d i e s , 66, 275-308.
[2] Aguirregabiria, V. (2007): “Another Look at the Identiﬁcation of Dynamic Discrete Decision
Processes: With an Application to Retirement Behavior,” manuscript. University of Toronto.
[3] Aguirregabiria, V. and P. Mira (2002): "Swapping the Nested Fixed Point Algorithm: A Class
of Estimators for Discrete Markov Decision Models," Econometrica, 70, 1519-1543.
[4] Aguirregabiria, V. and P. Mira (2007): “Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games,"
Econometrica, 75 (1), 1—54.
[5] Aguirregabiria, V., P. Mira, and H. Roman (2007): "An Estimable Dynamic Model of Entry,
Exit and Growth in Oligopoly Retail Markets", American Economic Review, 97 (2), 449-454.
[6] Altug, S. and R. Miller (1998): "The Eﬀect of Work Experience on Female Wages and Labour
Supply," Review of Economic Studies, 65, 45-85.
[7] Albrecht, J. and B. Axell (1984): "An Equilibrium Model of Search Unemployment," Journal
of Political Economy, 92 (5), 824-840.
[8] Andrews, D. (1988): “Chi-Square Diagnostic Tests for Econometric Models” Journal of Econo-
metrics, 37 135—156.
[9] Arcidiacono, P. and J. Jones (2003): "Finite Mixture Distributions, Sequential Likelihood, and
the EM Algorithm,” Econometrica, 71, 933-946.
[10] Arcidiacono, P. and R. Miller (2006): "CCP Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Choice Models
with Unobserved Heterogeneity," manuscript. Carnegie Mellon University.
[11] Arcidiacono, P., H. Sieg and F. Sloan (2007): "Living Rationally Under the Volcano? An
Empirical Analysis of Heavy Drinking and Smoking," International Economic Review, 48(1),
37-65.
[12] Bajari, P., L. Benkard and J. Levin (2006): “Estimating dynamic models of imperfect compe-
tition,” Econometrica, forthcoming.
[13] Bajari, P. and H. Hong (2005): “Semiparametric Estimation of a Dynamic Game of Incomplete
Information," manuscript. Duke University.
[14] Benitez-Silva, H., G. Hall, G. Hitsch, and J. Rust (2005): "A Comparison of Discrete and Para-
metric Approximation Methods for Solving Dynamic Programming Problems in Economics,"
manuscript. Department of Economics. University of Maryland.
[15] Bound, J., T. Stinebrickner and T. Waidman (2005): "Using a Structural Retirement Model
to Simulate the Eﬀect of Changes to the Oasdi and Medicare Programs," Economic Research
Initiative on the Uninsured Working Paper Series. Number 51.
63[16] Chernozhukov, V., Hong, H., and E. Tamer (2007): “Parameter Set Inference in a Class of
Econometric Models,” Econometrica, forthcoming.
[17] Collard-Wexler, A. (2006): "Demand Fluctuations and Plant Turnover in the Ready-to-Mix
Concrete Industry," Mimeo. New York University.
[18] Das, M. (1992): “A Micro-econometric Model of Capital Utilization and Retirement: The Case
of the Cement Industry,” Review of Economic Studies, 59, 277-297.
[19] Delavande, A. (2006): “Pill, Patch or Shot? Subjective Expectations and Birth Control
Choice,” manuscript. Universidade Nova de Lisboa.
[20] Doraszelski, U. & Satterthwaite, M. (2003): ”Foundations of Markov-perfect industry dynam-
ics: Existence, puriﬁcation, and multiplicity,” Working paper, Hoover Institution, Stanford.
[21] Eckstein, Z., and G. van den Berg (2007): ”Empirical labor search: a survey”, Journal of
Econometrics, 136(2), 531-564.
[22] Eckstein, Z., and K. Wolpin (1989): ”The speciﬁcation and estimation of dynamic stochastic
discrete choice models,” Journal of Human Resources, 24, 562-598.
[23] Eckstein, Z. and K. Wolpin (1990): "Estimating a Market Equilibrium Search Model from
Panel Data on Individuals," Econometrica, 58(4), 783-808.
[24] Eckstein, Z. and K. Wolpin (1999): "Why Youth Drop out of High School: The Impact of
Preferences, Opportunities and Abilities," Econometrica, 67, 1295-1339.
[25] Erdem, T., S. Imai and M. P. Keane (2003): “Brand and Quantity Choice Dynamics under
Price Uncertainty,” Quantitative Marketing and Economics,1 ,5 - 6 4 .
[26] Ericson, R., and A. Pakes (1995): ”Markov-Perfect industry dynamics: A framework for
empirical work”, Review of Economic Studies, 62, 53-82.
[27] Fernández-Villaverde, J., J. Rubio-Ramírez, and M. Santos (2006): "Convergence Properties
of the Likelihood of Computed Dynamic Models," Econometrica, 74 (1), 93-119.
[28] Ferrall, C. (2005): "Solving Finite Mixture Models: Eﬃcient Computation in Economics under
Serial and Parallel Execution," Computational Economics, 25(4), 343-379.
[29] Geweke, J. (1996): "Monte Carlo simulation and numerical integration," in H. Amman, D.
Kendrick, and J. Rust (eds.) Handbook of Computational Economics, chapter 15, pages 731-
800. North-Holland. Amsterdam.
[30] Geweke, J. and M. Keane (2000). "Bayesian Inference for Dynamic Discrete Choice Mod-
els without the Need for Dynamic Programming." in book Simulation Based Inference and
Econometrics: Methods and Applications, Mariano, Schuermann and Weeks (eds.), Cambridge
University Press, 100-131.
[31] Gilleskie, D. (1998): ”A Dynamic Stochastic Model of Medical Care Use and Work Absence,”
Econometrica, 66, 1-45.
64[32] Hajivassiliou, V. and P. Rudd (1994): "Classical Estimation Methods for LDV Models Using
Simulation," in The Handbook of Econometrics, Volume 4, D. McFadden and R. Engle (eds.).
North-Holland: Amsterdam.
[33] Hall, G. and J. Rust (2005): "Simulated Minimum Distance Estimation of a Model of Optimal
Commodity Price Speculation with Endogenously Sampled Prices," manuscript. Department
of Economics. University of Maryland.
[34] Heckman, J. (1981): “The incidental parameters problem and the problem of initial conditions
in estimating a discrete time - discrete data stochastic process,” in C. Manski and D. McFadden
(eds.), Structural Analysis of Discrete Data with Econometric Applications.M I TP r e s s .
[35] Heckman, J., L. Lochner, and C. Taber (1998): "Explaining Rising Wage Inequality: Expla-
nations With A Dynamic General Equilibrium Model of Labor Earnings With Heterogeneous
Agents," Review of Economic Dynamics, 1(1), 1-58.
[36] Heckman, J., and B. Singer (1984): "A method for minimizing the impact of distributional
assumptions in economic models for duration data," Econometrica, 52, 271-320.
[37] Heckman, J. and S. Navarro (2007): "Dynam i cD i s c r e t eC h o i c ea n dD y n a m i cT r e a t m e n t
Eﬀects," Journal of Econometrics, 136(2), 341-396.
[38] Hendel, I., and A. Nevo (2006): "Measuring the Implications of Sales and Consumer Inventory
Behavior," Econometrica, 74(6), 1637-1674.
[39] Holliﬁeld, B. R. Miller, and P. Sandas (2004): "Empirical Analysis of Limit Order Markets,"
Review of Economic Studies, 71, 1027-1063.
[40] Hotz, J., and R.A. Miller (1993): “Conditional choice probabilities and the estimation of
dynamic models,” Review of Economic Studies, 60, 497-529.
[41] Hotz, J., R.A. Miller, S. Sanders, and J. Smith (1994): ”A simulation estimator for dynamic
models of discrete choice,” Review of Economic Studies, 61, 265-89.
[42] Imai, S., N. Jain, and A. Ching (2007): "Bayesian Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Choice
Models," Mimeo. University of Toronto.
[43] Jofre-Bonet, M. and M. Pesendorfer (2003): "Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game," Econo-
metrica, 71, 1443—1489.
[44] Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1979): “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under
Risk,” Econometrica, 47, 263-292.
[45] Kano, K. (2006): “Menu Costs, Strategic Interactions and Retail Price Movements," manu-
script. Queen’s University.
[46] Karlstrom, A., M. Palme and I. Svensson (2004): "A dynamic programming approach to model
the retirement behaviour of blue-collar workers in Sweden," Journal of Applied Econometrics,
19, 795-807.
65[47] Kasahara, H. and K. Shimotsu (2006a): "Nested Pseudo-likelihood Estimation and Bootstrap-
based Inference for Structural Discrete Markov Decision Models," manuscript. Department of
Economics. The University of Western Ontario.
[48] Kasahara, H. and K. Shimotsu (2006b): "Nonparametric Identiﬁcation and Estimation of
Finite Mixture Models of Dynamic Discrete Choices," manuscript. Department of Economics.
The University of Western Ontario.
[49] Keane, Michael P and Wolpin, Kenneth I (1994): "The Solution and Estimation of Discrete
Choice Dynamic Programming Models by Simulation and Interpolation: Monte Carlo Evi-
dence," The Review of Economics and Statistics, 76(4), 648-72.
[50] Keane, M. and K. Wolpin (1997): "The career decisions of young men," Journal of Political
Economy, 105, 473-522.
[51] Keane, M. and K. Wolpin (2000): "Estimating Welfare Eﬀects Consistent with Forward-
Looking Behavior. Part I: Lessons from a Simulation Exercise," PIER Working Paper 01-019.
University of Pennsylvania.
[52] Keane, M. and K. Wolpin (2000): "Estimating Welfare Eﬀects Consistent with Forward-
Looking Behavior. Part II: Empirical Results," PIER Working Paper 01-020. University of
Pennsylvania.
[53] Keane, M. and K. Wolpin (2001): "The Eﬀect of Parental Transfers and Borrowing Constraints
on Educational Attainment," International Economic Review, 42, 1051-1103.
[54] Keane, M. and K. Wolpin (2007): “Exploring the Usefulness of a Non-Random Holdout Sample
for Model Validation: Welfare Eﬀects on Female Behavior,” International Economic Review,
forthcoming.
[55] Kennet, M. (1993) “Did Deregulation Aﬀect Aircraft Engine Maintenance? An Empirical
Policy Analysis," The RAND Journal of Economics, 24, 542-558.
[56] Kennet, M. (1994): “A Structural Model of Aircraft Engine Maintenance,” Journal of Applied
Econometrics, 9, 351-368.
[57] Krusell, P. and A. Smith (1998): "Income and Wealth Heterogeneity in the Macroeconomy,"
Journal of Political Economy, 106(5), 867-896.
[58] Lancaster, A. (1997): "Exact Structural Inference in Optimal Job-Search Models," Journal of
Business and Economic Statistics, 15(2), 165-179.
[59] Lee, Donghoon (2005) ”An estimable dynamic general equilibrium model of work, schooling
and occupational choice”. International Economic Review,f o r t h c o m i n g .
[60] Lee, D. and K. Wolpin (2006): “Intersectoral labor mobility and the growth of the service
sector”. Econometrica, 74 (1), 1-46.
[61] Lerman, S. and C. Manski (1981): “On the Use of Simulated Frequencies to Approximate
Choice Probabilities,” in C. Manski and D. McFadden (eds.), Structural Analysis of Discrete
Data with Econometric Applications, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
66[62] Lorincz, S. (2005): "Persistence Eﬀects in a Dynamic Discrete Choice Model: Application to
Low-End Computer Servers." Discussion Papers 2005/10. Institute of Economics Hungarian
Academy of Sciences
[63] Lumsdaine, R., J. Stock, and D. Wise (1992): "Three Models of Retirement: Computational
Complexity versus Predictive Validity," in David A. Wise (ed.), Topics in the economics of
aging, pp. 16-60. University of Chicago Press. Chicago.
[64] Magnac, T. and Thesmar, D. (2002): "Identifying Dynamic Discrete Decision Processes”.
Econometrica, 70, 801-816.
[65] Manski, C. (1993): ”Dynamic choice in social settings: Learning from the experience of others”,
Journal of Econometrics 58, pp. 121-36.
[66] Manski, C. (2004): "Measuring Expectations," Econometrica, 72 (5), 1329-1376.
[67] Miller, R. (1984): "Job Matching and Occupational Choice", Journal of Political Economy,
92, 1086-1120.
[68] Miller, R. (1997): ”Estimating Models of Dynamic Optimization with Microeconomic Data,”
in H. Pesaran and P. Smidth (eds.) Handbook of Applied Econometrics: Microeconomics (Vol
2). Blackwell.
[69] Miller, R., and S. Sanders (1997): ”Human Capital Development and Welfare Participation”,
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 46, 1-44.
[70] Mortensen, D. and C. Pissarides: ”New developments in models of search in the labor market”,
Handbook of Labor Economics vol. 2, Chap. 39, 2567-2627.
[71] Pakes, A. (1986): ”Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding European
Patent Stocks,” Econometrica, 54, 755-84.
[72] Pakes, A. (1994): ”Dynamic structural models, problems and prospects”, in C. Sims (ed.)
Advances in Econometrics. Sixth World Congress, Cambridge University Press.
[73] Pakes, A., M. Ostrovsky, and S. Berry (2004): “Simple estimators for the parameters of discrete
dynamic games (with entry/exit examples),” manuscript, Harvard University.
[74] Pesendorfer, M. and Schmidt-Dengler (2007): “Asymptotic Least Squares Estimators for Dy-
namic Games," forthcoming in The Review of Economic Studies.
[75] Rota, P. (2004): "Estimating Labor Demand with Fixed Costs," International Economic Re-
view, 45, 25-48.
[76] Rios-Rull, J. V. (1999): “Computation of Equilibria in Heterogeneous Agent Models,” in
Computational Methods for the Study of Dynamic Economies: An Introduction, R. Marimon
and S.Scott (eds.). Oxford University Press. Oxford.
[77] Rust, J. (1987): ”Optimal replacement of GMC bus engines: An empirical model of Harold
Zurcher,” Econometrica, 55, 999-1033.
67[78] Rust, J. (1994): ”Estimation of dynamic structural models, problems and prospects: dis-
crete decision processes”, in C. Sims (ed.) Advances in Econometrics. Sixth World Congress,
Cambridge University Press.
[79] Rust, J. (1994): ”Structural estimation of Markov decision processes,” in R. E. Engle and
McFadden (eds.) Handbook of Econometrics Volume 4, North-Holland. Amsterdam.
[80] Rust, J. and G. Rothwell (1995): "Optimal Response to a Shift in Regulatory Regime: The
Case of the US Nuclear Power Industry," Journal of Applied Econometrics, 10, S75-S118.
[81] Rust, J. and C. Phelan (1997): "How Social Security and Medicare Aﬀect Retirement Behavior
in a World of Incomplete Markets," Econometrica, 65, 781-832.
[82] Ryan, S. (2004): "The Costs of Environmental Regulation in a Concentrated Industry," man-
uscript, MIT Department of Economics.
[83] Sanchez-Mangas, R. (2002): “Pseudo Maximum Likelihood Estimation of a Dynamic Struc-
tural Investment Model,” Working Paper 02-62, Statistics and Econometrics Series. Departa-
mento de Estadística y Econometría. Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
[84] Slade, M. (1998): ”Optimal Pricing with Costly Adjustment: Evidence from Retail Grocery
Stores”, Review of Economic Studies, 65, 87-108.
[85] Stern, S. (1997): "Simulation-based estimation," Journal of Economic Literature, 35, 2006—
2039.
[86] Stinebrickner, T. (2000): "Serially Correlated Variables in Dynamic Discrete Choice Models,"
Journal of Applied Econometrics, 15 (6), 595-624.
[87] Sturm, R. (1991) “A Structural Economic Model of Operating Cycle Management in European
Nuclear Power Plants,” manuscript, RAND Corporation.
[88] Todd, P. and K. Wolpin (2006): “Assessing the Impact of a School Subsidy Program in
Mexico.” American Economic Review, 96 (5), 1384—1417.
[89] Van der Klaauw, W. and K. Wolpin (2005): “Social Security and the Retirement and Sav-
ings Behavior of Low Income Households,” PIER Working Paper 05-020. Penn Institute for
Economic Research. Department of Economics. University of Pennsylvania.
[90] Wolpin, K. (1984) “An Estimable Dynamic Stochastic Model of Fertility and Child Mortality,"
Journal of Political Economy, 92, 852-874.
[91] Wolpin, K. (1987) “Estimating a Structural Search Model: The Transition from Schooling to
Work,” Econometrica, 55, 801-818.
[92] Wolpin, K. (1996): ”Public-Policy Uses of Discrete-Choice Dynamic Programming Models,”
American Economic Review, 86, 427-32.
[93] Wolpin, K. (2007): “Model Validation and Model Comparison Ex Ante Policy Evaluation,
Structural Estimation, and Model Selection," American Economic Review, 97 (2), 48—52.
68